diff --git a/arch/x86/configs/common.fragment b/arch/x86/configs/common.fragment index 7b86f1f5ca92..0c7f4969e886 100644 --- a/arch/x86/configs/common.fragment +++ b/arch/x86/configs/common.fragment @@ -209,3 +209,28 @@ CONFIG_NETFILTER_XT_NAT=y CONFIG_NETFILTER_XT_TARGET_MASQUERADE=y CONFIG_NETFILTER_XT_TARGET_REDIRECT=y CONFIG_NETFILTER_XT_TARGET_NETMAP=y + +# Secure Boot (two-stage GRUB, db + GPG): dm-verity root hash signatures +# checked against the platform keyring (UEFI db), lockdown forced to +# integrity, and kexec limited to signed images. PLATFORM_KEYRING is set +# explicitly because its default follows the SECONDARY_KEYRING choice. +# SIGNED_PE_FILE_VERIFICATION is what KEXEC_BZIMAGE_VERIFY_SIG depends on; +# without a verifier, KEXEC_SIG_FORCE rejects every kexec. +CONFIG_DM_VERITY=y +CONFIG_DM_VERITY_VERIFY_ROOTHASH_SIG=y +CONFIG_DM_VERITY_VERIFY_ROOTHASH_SIG_PLATFORM_KEYRING=y +CONFIG_INTEGRITY_SIGNATURE=y +CONFIG_INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS=y +CONFIG_INTEGRITY_PLATFORM_KEYRING=y +CONFIG_SECURITY_LOCKDOWN_LSM=y +CONFIG_SECURITY_LOCKDOWN_LSM_EARLY=y +CONFIG_LOCK_DOWN_KERNEL_FORCE_INTEGRITY=y +CONFIG_SIGNED_PE_FILE_VERIFICATION=y +CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG=y +CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG_FORCE=y +CONFIG_KEXEC_BZIMAGE_VERIFY_SIG=y + +# efi-pstore built in, not a module: a panic in the initrd (dm-verity root +# hash rejected) happens before any module loads and must still be recorded. +CONFIG_PSTORE=y +CONFIG_EFI_VARS_PSTORE=y diff --git a/arch/x86/configs/rt.fragment b/arch/x86/configs/rt.fragment index e0ef4c386d35..37a0bef82bb8 100644 --- a/arch/x86/configs/rt.fragment +++ b/arch/x86/configs/rt.fragment @@ -24,3 +24,8 @@ CONFIG_RCU_NOCB_CPU=y CONFIG_RCU_NOCB_CPU_CB_BOOST=y # CONFIG_RCU_NOCB_CPU_DEFAULT_ALL is not set CONFIG_VIRT_CPU_ACCOUNTING=y +# EFI_DISABLE_RUNTIME defaults to y under PREEMPT_RT. Secure Boot needs EFI +# runtime services: the kernel reads db into the .platform keyring that +# dm-verity root hash and kexec signatures are checked against, and +# efi-pstore stores panic records in EFI variables. +# CONFIG_EFI_DISABLE_RUNTIME is not set diff --git a/security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c b/security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c index c0d6948446c3..0bd1ba61c890 100644 --- a/security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c +++ b/security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c @@ -39,6 +39,19 @@ static const struct dmi_system_id uefi_skip_cert[] = { { } }; +/* + * shim creates MokListRT, MokListXRT and MokIgnoreDB as volatile variables on + * every boot. A non-volatile variable with one of these names was written by + * an OS, not by shim, and must not decide which keys the kernel trusts. + */ +static __init bool shim_volatile(const char *name, u32 attr) +{ + if (!(attr & EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE)) + return true; + pr_warn("Ignoring non-volatile %s, which shim did not create\n", name); + return false; +} + /* * Look to see if a UEFI variable called MokIgnoreDB exists and return true if * it does. @@ -54,16 +67,19 @@ static __init bool uefi_check_ignore_db(void) unsigned int db = 0; unsigned long size = sizeof(db); efi_guid_t guid = EFI_SHIM_LOCK_GUID; + u32 attr = 0; - status = efi.get_variable(L"MokIgnoreDB", &guid, NULL, &size, &db); - return status == EFI_SUCCESS; + status = efi.get_variable(L"MokIgnoreDB", &guid, &attr, &size, &db); + return status == EFI_SUCCESS && shim_volatile("MokIgnoreDB", attr); } /* - * Get a certificate list blob from the named EFI variable. + * Get a certificate list blob from the named EFI variable, and its attributes + * in *attr if attr is not NULL. */ static __init void *get_cert_list(efi_char16_t *name, efi_guid_t *guid, - unsigned long *size, efi_status_t *status) + unsigned long *size, efi_status_t *status, + u32 *attr) { unsigned long lsize = 4; unsigned long tmpdb[4]; @@ -82,7 +98,7 @@ static __init void *get_cert_list(efi_char16_t *name, efi_guid_t *guid, if (!db) return NULL; - *status = efi.get_variable(name, guid, NULL, &lsize, db); + *status = efi.get_variable(name, guid, attr, &lsize, db); if (*status != EFI_SUCCESS) { kfree(db); pr_err("Error reading db var: 0x%lx\n", *status); @@ -111,6 +127,7 @@ static int __init load_moklist_certs(void) void *mok; unsigned long moksize; efi_status_t status; + u32 attr = 0; int rc; /* First try to load certs from the EFI MOKvar config table. @@ -134,7 +151,11 @@ static int __init load_moklist_certs(void) /* Get MokListRT. It might not exist, so it isn't an error * if we can't get it. */ - mok = get_cert_list(L"MokListRT", &mok_var, &moksize, &status); + mok = get_cert_list(L"MokListRT", &mok_var, &moksize, &status, &attr); + if (mok && !shim_volatile("MokListRT", attr)) { + kfree(mok); + return 0; + } if (mok) { rc = parse_efi_signature_list("UEFI:MokListRT", mok, moksize, get_handler_for_mok); @@ -164,6 +185,7 @@ static int __init load_uefi_certs(void) void *db = NULL, *dbx = NULL, *mokx = NULL; unsigned long dbsize = 0, dbxsize = 0, mokxsize = 0; efi_status_t status; + u32 attr = 0; int rc = 0; const struct dmi_system_id *dmi_id; @@ -180,7 +202,7 @@ static int __init load_uefi_certs(void) * if we can't get them. */ if (!uefi_check_ignore_db()) { - db = get_cert_list(L"db", &secure_var, &dbsize, &status); + db = get_cert_list(L"db", &secure_var, &dbsize, &status, NULL); if (!db) { if (status == EFI_NOT_FOUND) pr_debug("MODSIGN: db variable wasn't found\n"); @@ -196,7 +218,7 @@ static int __init load_uefi_certs(void) } } - dbx = get_cert_list(L"dbx", &secure_var, &dbxsize, &status); + dbx = get_cert_list(L"dbx", &secure_var, &dbxsize, &status, NULL); if (!dbx) { if (status == EFI_NOT_FOUND) pr_debug("dbx variable wasn't found\n"); @@ -215,7 +237,12 @@ static int __init load_uefi_certs(void) if (!arch_get_secureboot()) return 0; - mokx = get_cert_list(L"MokListXRT", &mok_var, &mokxsize, &status); + mokx = get_cert_list(L"MokListXRT", &mok_var, &mokxsize, &status, &attr); + if (mokx && !shim_volatile("MokListXRT", attr)) { + kfree(mokx); + mokx = NULL; + status = EFI_NOT_FOUND; + } if (!mokx) { if (status == EFI_NOT_FOUND) pr_debug("mokx variable wasn't found\n");