[program] External defensive-platform interoperability: Knowledge advisory and Deception engagement planes

[01rabbit]

Purpose

Evolve Azazel-Knowledge and Azazel-Deception into interoperable defensive
planes that can exchange bounded evidence and advisory context with external
EDR, firewall, router, switch, DNS, NDR, SIEM, asset, and vulnerability systems
while retaining first-class Edge/Nexus integration.

Non-negotiable authority model

External products -> observed telemetry -> Knowledge -> advisory context
                                                |
Edge/Nexus deterministic arbiter ----------------+-> approved bounded decision
                                                |
                                  Deception / approved device adapter
                                                |
                                  observation and evidence only

• Knowledge ingests, normalizes, correlates, and advises. It never commands an
  endpoint, firewall, network device, or Deception environment.
• Deception reports capability and materializes only a bounded, approved
  environment. It never chooses an engagement or freely reconfigures a network.
• Fabric carries descriptive contracts only. A manifest, signature, capability
  report, advisory, or observation cannot be an execution token.
• Edge-derived deterministic arbitration remains the only Azazel authority for
  autonomous bounded enforcement. External products retain their own approval
  and change-management authority.

Delivery order

1. Fabric: external observation/advisory/proposed-change contracts and negative
   authority tests.
2. Knowledge: read-only adapters and evidence-grounded advisory output.
3. Deception: read-only network-device observability, controlled-exposure
   adapter boundary, and bounded profiles.
4. Nexus: credential/trust lifecycle, adapter admission, local policy routing,
   audit/lease/rollback integration, and HIL.
5. Edge/Nexus first-party adapters are reference implementations; third-party
   adapters remain disabled until their declared evidence and safety gates pass.

Explicit non-goals

• a generic remote-command framework;
• unrestricted API tokens, shell access, or device configuration templates in
  a shared contract;
• automatic discovery followed by automatic changes;
• treating vendor severity, EDR verdict, or an attacker disappearance as proof
  of compromise, containment, or defensive success;
• cross-tenant data mixing or forwarding raw sensitive telemetry by default.

Program acceptance

• every connector has a declared source/product identity, schema/version,
  provenance, freshness, tenancy/privacy class, rate/size budget, and failure
  state;
• every advisory separates source facts, normalized facts, inference,
  limitations, and unknowns;
• every device-change proposal is non-executable until routed through an
  owning product's approval/lease/rollback process;
• loss, malformed data, replay, stale state, credential failure, and
  partial-device failure degrade safely and are audit-visible;
• Edge/Nexus standalone Core remains independent of every external product;
• HIL proves isolation, emergency withdrawal, and evidence preservation for
  every enabled exposure/redirect adapter.

[01rabbit]

Detailed implementation issues

Implementation is intentionally layered; do not start a later layer by
inventing a private wire format or control path.

1. Fabric azazel_runtimeディレクトリを削除し、設定ファイルをconfigディレクトリに統一 #25 — descriptive external observation, advisory, proposal, and
   device-change-observation contracts; recursive authority/secret rejection.
2. Knowledge #95 — read-only EDR/FW/NDR/SIEM/asset/vulnerability adapters,
   deterministic ingestion, provenance/privacy, and advisory output.
3. Deception Feature/vector buffer mac sync #39 — read-only network-device observations, dry-run exposure
   previews, then separately approved bounded device adapters with HIL gates.
4. Nexus Feature/vector fluentbit logging #16 — adapter admission, confinement, secret/trust lifecycle,
   routing, lease/rollback/audit integration, and integrated HIL.

First-party Edge/Nexus paths are reference consumers, not exceptions to the
authority model. A vendor-specific adapter must state its exact capability
subset and pass the same negative/rollback/isolation gates before it is enabled.