voltage-verify

Bind an Intel TDX quote and an NVIDIA GPU attestation to the workload you meant to run, then verify the bundle on your own machine, without trusting the cloud provider.

voltage-verify is a small command line tool with three roles:

1. On your machine, it writes a manifest: the container image digest, the digests of the model or files you care about, a free-text statement, and a fresh random challenge. Two hashes of that manifest become the commitments.
2. Inside the confidential VM, it asks the hardware to sign those commitments: the Intel TDX quote carries SHA-512(manifest) as its 64-byte report_data, and NVIDIA's Remote Attestation Service (NRAS) signs GPU claims over the nonce SHA-256(manifest). It writes one JSON bundle with the quote, the NVIDIA tokens and the public collateral needed to check them later.
3. Back on your machine, it verifies the bundle: Intel's signature chain to the pinned Intel SGX Root CA, the platform's TCB status against Intel's published TCB info, the Quoting Enclave identity, revocation lists, NVIDIA's ES384 signatures against NRAS's JWKS, the per-GPU claims (measurements ok, secure boot on, debug off), and above all that both proofs carry your commitments. Then it runs six negative tests to show that any change to the manifest, the challenge, the quote or a GPU claim is rejected.

It was written by VoltageGPU so that tenants of its Confidential VMs can verify more than "this is a TDX VM with a confidential GPU": they can verify that the two hardware proofs were produced for the workload described in a manifest they wrote, on a challenge they chose. The trust chain ends at Intel and NVIDIA, never at VoltageGPU.

What it proves, and what it does not

Verified means:

• the TDX quote was produced inside a genuine Intel TDX Trust Domain, on a platform whose provisioning certificate chains to Intel's root, at an acceptable TCB level, by a genuine Quoting Enclave, and it embeds SHA-512 of your manifest;
• NVIDIA's service signed, over SHA-256 of your manifest, that the GPU(s) in that VM passed attestation with secure boot on and debugging off;
• both proofs were made after you issued the challenge, so they cannot be replayed from an earlier session or copied from another tenant.

Verified does not mean:

• that the GPU executed the image or model named in the manifest. Binding a manifest to a quote proves the hardware signed your description of the workload; proving that this exact code ran needs a measured launcher (for instance the Confidential Containers project with a key broker), which is outside this tool;
• anything about the VM's own software stack beyond what the TDX measurements (MRTD, RTMR0..3) say. The tool prints them; comparing them against a reference image is your policy, not the tool's;
• anything about a VM you did not attest yourself.

docs/WHAT_IT_PROVES.md goes through every check and its limit.

Install

# verifier machine: Python 3.10+, cryptography, PyJWT
pip install voltage-verify
# inside the VM: the NVIDIA SDK first (it pins cryptography and PyJWT), then the tool
pip install nv-attestation-sdk nvidia-ml-py
pip install --no-deps voltage-verify

Source and issues: https://github.com/Jabsama/voltage-verify. The same wheel and source archive are mirrored with SHA-256 sums at https://voltagegpu.com/blog/two-proofs/voltage-verify/ for installs that must not touch PyPI (pip install <wheel URL>).

Reference run

examples/hello-workload/ holds a real bundle captured on 12 September 2026 on a VoltageGPU h100-xlarge Confidential VM (8x H100, NVIDIA Protected PCIe mode), with its manifest and the unedited run log. Replay the verification on your own machine:

voltage-verify verify examples/hello-workload/bundle-8xh100-2026-09-12.json \
    --challenge ef7f54c160627ee536a02b5e73896ac4b1ac2cdefdb7cfaaf2366a7d33cc8731 --hwmodel GH100 --gpus 8
voltage-verify selftest examples/hello-workload/bundle-8xh100-2026-09-12.json

Expected: every check PASS, platform TCB UpToDate, Quoting Enclave UpToDate, eight GH100 devices with measres success, then six mutations rejected. Read those tokens for what they are: in Protected PCIe mode nvidia-smi reports CC State: OFF next to Multi-GPU Mode: Protected PCIe (the normal reading for that mode, kept in the bundle's environment section), NVIDIA attested each of the eight GPUs individually, the NVSwitch fabric is not attested, and this is not the single-GPU CC State: ON mode of an H200 VM. docs/WHAT_IT_PROVES.md spells out the difference.

Use

On your machine, describe the workload and generate a challenge:

voltage-verify manifest --image ghcr.io/you/app:1.4.2 --artifact model.safetensors \
    --statement "inference run for customer X" -o manifest.json

Copy manifest.json into the VM (scp), then, as root inside the VM:

sudo -E python -m voltage_verify attest --manifest manifest.json -o bundle.json

Copy bundle.json back, then:

voltage-verify verify bundle.json --challenge <the challenge printed by `manifest`>
voltage-verify selftest bundle.json --challenge <same>
voltage-verify verify bundle.json --offline      # same checks, from the collateral in the bundle

Exit code 0 means verified, 1 means a required check failed, 2 means the bundle or arguments are unusable. --json prints the machine-readable report.

Works with any Intel TDX host, any provider

Nothing here is VoltageGPU-specific, and the tool does not call VoltageGPU's API to attest or to verify. manifest and verify run entirely on your own machine. attest reads the kernel's own confidential-computing interface, /sys/kernel/config/tsm/report (configfs TSM, upstream since Linux 6.7, present on any distribution with a recent kernel), and calls NVIDIA's own SDK, nv-attestation-sdk, to talk to NVIDIA's Remote Attestation Service. Neither of those is a VoltageGPU endpoint. So attest runs the same way inside a TDX guest on Azure, on GCP, on a bare metal TDX host with a passthrough NVIDIA GPU, or on VoltageGPU: the interface is the Linux kernel and NVIDIA's own service, not us. verify checks the bundle against Intel's and NVIDIA's public collateral, also fetched from Intel and NVIDIA, never from VoltageGPU.

What this means in practice: if your workload runs on a TDX VM with an NVIDIA H100, H200, or Blackwell GPU in confidential compute mode, anywhere, voltage-verify attest inside that VM and voltage-verify verify on your laptop give you the same tenant-side proof this tool was built to give VoltageGPU's own customers. We have not run this against every cloud ourselves (the reference run above is on our own fleet, because that is the hardware we have), so if you verify a bundle produced elsewhere, an issue or a pull request with what you saw, good or bad, is exactly the kind of report SECURITY.md and this repository want.

Verify a quote from anywhere

quote takes a bare Intel TDX quote, from any provider, any tool, and runs the Intel half of the checks on it: structure, signature chain up to the pinned Intel root, then TCB status, QE identity and revocation from Intel PCS. No manifest, no NVIDIA token, no VoltageGPU anywhere in the path. The file can be the raw bytes written by /sys/kernel/config/tsm/report, or hex, or base64.

voltage-verify quote quote.bin
voltage-verify quote quote.bin --report-data <64 bytes hex>   # bind it to the nonce you issued
voltage-verify quote quote.bin --offline                       # structure and signatures only
voltage-verify quote quote.bin --accept-out-of-date --json

Tested on Google's production Sapphire Rapids quote from go-tdx-guest (vendored in tests/fixtures/third-party/, Apache 2.0). Output on 18 September 2026:

[PASS] tdx.structure   TDX quote v4, TEE 0x81, 4935 bytes
[WARN] tdx.trailing    39 bytes after the signature data were ignored (not covered by any signature)
[PASS] tdx.signatures  attestation key, QE binding, QE report and PCK chain verify up to the pinned Intel SGX Root CA
[PASS] tdx.collateral  TCB info and QE identity signed by Intel (Intel PCS, fetched now)
[WARN] tdx.tcb         no TCB level in Intel's TCB info matches this platform (treat as OutOfDate)

Two things to read in that output. The trailing bytes are a marker Google appends on purpose in its test vector; they sit outside the signed region and are reported, not silently dropped. The TCB warning is real: that 2023 quote comes from a platform whose firmware level Intel no longer lists, so a verifier must call it OutOfDate. Without --accept-out-of-date the exit code is 1, which is the right answer for a quote you would rely on today.

Bundle format

Documented in docs/BUNDLE_FORMAT.md. In short: the manifest verbatim, both commitments, the raw TDX quote (base64), the NRAS token array as returned by the NVIDIA SDK, NRAS's JWKS and Intel's TCB info, QE identity and CRLs as fetched at attestation time, plus a few facts about the VM (kernel, driver, nvidia-smi conf-compute -q). The verifier trusts none of it: it recomputes the commitments from the manifest and checks every signature.

Development

python -m venv .venv && . .venv/bin/activate
pip install -e ".[dev]"
pytest
ruff check src tests

The tests run offline against real evidence: a TDX quote captured on a VoltageGPU H200 VM on 4 September 2026, NRAS tokens from 4 and 10 September 2026 (single H200, 8x H100 node in NVIDIA Protected PCIe mode), and a snapshot of Intel's collateral and NVIDIA's JWKS.

See also

• confidential-gpu-attestation-evidence: every dated bundle this tool has verified on VoltageGPU's fleet since 4 September 2026, including the runs that fail (NVSwitch fabric from a TDX guest), re-verifiable with voltage-verify verify.
• tdx-guest-probe: one script that lists what a TDX guest can observe and the host setting it cannot, useful before trusting any quote.

Security

See SECURITY.md. In one line: report anything that would make verify say yes when it should say no to contact@voltagegpu.com, and expect an answer within two working days.

License

MIT. Copyright 2026 VOLTAGE EI (VoltageGPU).