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Security: MPV/kir

Security

SECURITY.md

Security policy

Reporting a vulnerability

Report privately through GitHub: Security → Advisories → Report a vulnerability.

Please don't open a public issue for something exploitable — the advisory draft is private until we publish it, and it gives us a place to work on a fix with you.

Include what you'd need yourself: the manifest (or a reduced version of it) that triggers the behaviour, the kir version from kir --version, and what you expected instead. A reproducer we can run beats a description we have to reconstruct.

kir is maintained by volunteers, so we can't promise a response time. We'll acknowledge a report as soon as we see it and keep you updated as we work on it.

What counts as a vulnerability

kir decides which images a scanner is asked about. An image it fails to report isn't flagged as unscanned — it's never considered, and the scan comes back clean. So the reports we most want are the ones where kir under-reports without saying so:

  • A manifest whose images kir omits from stdout while exiting 0.
  • A document kir treats as image-less when it does describe containers.
  • Anything that makes kir exit 0 on input it did not fully understand.

Also in scope:

  • Output that misrepresents what will be scanned — an image reference that renders as something other than the value passed downstream, or that breaks the newline-separated contract stdout is meant to keep.
  • Input that makes kir consume unbounded resources, or read files outside the paths it was given.
  • Anything undermining the integrity of a published release: the signing pipeline, the release workflow, or the container image.

Out of scope: a malformed or unreadable input causing an error: on stderr and a non-zero exit. That is the designed behaviour — see ADR 0008.

Supported versions

kir is pre-1.0 and releases roll forward. Fixes go into the next release from master; there are no maintenance branches for older versions. Report against the latest release where you can.

Verifying a release

Binaries and container images are signed keylessly with cosign. CONTRIBUTING.md has the verification commands — worth running before you trust a downloaded artifact, and worth telling us about if they fail.

There aren't any published security advisories