FIG is a wire protocol for trading systems: this document covers the FIG repository (protocol stack, libraries, gateways, and bindings). A venue running FIG owns its own credentials, matching, and compliance — see docs/SECURITY_AUDIT.md for the review checklist and SPEC.md §10 for the normative security model.
Please do not open a public issue for security problems.
Use GitHub's private reporting flow — Security → Report a vulnerability on this repository — or email the maintainers if you cannot use it. Include:
- affected component (
fig-core, a gateway, a binding, the spec) and version; - a reproducer (server config, crafted frames, and the observed behavior);
- impact: what an attacker gains (e.g. session forgery, panic/DoS, auth bypass);
- whether the issue is reachable in a default deployment.
We aim to acknowledge reports within 3 business days and to ship a fix or a documented mitigation for confirmed issues before public disclosure. Please give us a reasonable window to release a fix before publishing details.
Protocol version remains SPEC.md 1.0.0 (Stable) and changes only on a wire break. The schema catalog is additive. Rust library APIs may still change between minor releases. Security fixes land on the latest minor release line; older minor versions are not maintained (COMPATIBILITY.md). There are no published crates.io artifacts yet — fixes are delivered as repository commits.
| Version | Supported |
|---|---|
| Latest minor (1.1.x and newer) | ✅ |
| Older minors | ❌ |
| In scope | Notes |
|---|---|
| Frame/TLV decoding, fragmentation, SBE/CBOR codecs | Panics, OOB reads, unbounded allocation on hostile input |
| TREE transport configuration | TLS verification, 0-RTT handling, replay |
| Session resumption tokens | Forgery, replay, cross-node acceptance |
Wire auth (AUTH_TOKEN, JWT, path scoping, mTLS) |
Bypass, timing, algorithm confusion |
| Gateways (FIX/REST/WebSocket/OUCH/ITCH) | Parsing of untrusted legacy input, auth translation |
C ABI (fig-ffi) and bindings |
Memory safety, ownership across the boundary |
- Credential issuance — API keys, JWT signing services, KMS policy, and admin tooling are venue responsibilities (FIG only verifies).
- Venue business logic — matching, risk, funding, liquidations, compliance.
- Findings requiring a modified or local build with security controls disabled
(
FIG_TLS_INSECURE=1,FIG_DEV_OPEN=1, or the*_insecure()APIs). These are documented development-only switches; a report that they disable a control is not a vulnerability, but reaching them in the default configuration is. - Denial of service via resource exhaustion on the reference simulator
(
fig-exchange-sim), which is not production infrastructure.
Documented per item in docs/SECURITY_AUDIT.md:
- TLS 1.3 with server-certificate verification on by default; private-PKI
pinning via
FIG_TLS_CA; CA-verified mTLS (FIG_MTLS_CA). - Server-signed (HMAC-SHA256) session resumption tokens, verified before any state is restored; replays rejected inside the window, cluster-wide with Redis.
- Bounds-checked frame, SBE, FIX, and TLV decoding, with
frame_decodeandsbe_decodefuzz targets in CI. - Connection resource limits (
DoSGuard,ChannelRateLimiter) enforced on the receive path. Publicmarketdata/…REQUEST/SUBSCRIBE is additionally capped by tier (MdRateLimiter; SPEC §9.3). - Constant-time token comparison; JWT
algpinned to the expected algorithm. - Token signing-key rotation without downtime: docs/JWT_KEY_ROTATION.md.