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Security: Macho0x/FIG

Security

SECURITY.md

Security Policy

FIG is a wire protocol for trading systems: this document covers the FIG repository (protocol stack, libraries, gateways, and bindings). A venue running FIG owns its own credentials, matching, and compliance — see docs/SECURITY_AUDIT.md for the review checklist and SPEC.md §10 for the normative security model.

Reporting a vulnerability

Please do not open a public issue for security problems.

Use GitHub's private reporting flow — Security → Report a vulnerability on this repository — or email the maintainers if you cannot use it. Include:

  • affected component (fig-core, a gateway, a binding, the spec) and version;
  • a reproducer (server config, crafted frames, and the observed behavior);
  • impact: what an attacker gains (e.g. session forgery, panic/DoS, auth bypass);
  • whether the issue is reachable in a default deployment.

We aim to acknowledge reports within 3 business days and to ship a fix or a documented mitigation for confirmed issues before public disclosure. Please give us a reasonable window to release a fix before publishing details.

Supported versions

Protocol version remains SPEC.md 1.0.0 (Stable) and changes only on a wire break. The schema catalog is additive. Rust library APIs may still change between minor releases. Security fixes land on the latest minor release line; older minor versions are not maintained (COMPATIBILITY.md). There are no published crates.io artifacts yet — fixes are delivered as repository commits.

Version Supported
Latest minor (1.1.x and newer) ✅
Older minors ❌

What is in scope

In scope Notes
Frame/TLV decoding, fragmentation, SBE/CBOR codecs Panics, OOB reads, unbounded allocation on hostile input
TREE transport configuration TLS verification, 0-RTT handling, replay
Session resumption tokens Forgery, replay, cross-node acceptance
Wire auth (AUTH_TOKEN, JWT, path scoping, mTLS) Bypass, timing, algorithm confusion
Gateways (FIX/REST/WebSocket/OUCH/ITCH) Parsing of untrusted legacy input, auth translation
C ABI (fig-ffi) and bindings Memory safety, ownership across the boundary

What is out of scope

  • Credential issuance — API keys, JWT signing services, KMS policy, and admin tooling are venue responsibilities (FIG only verifies).
  • Venue business logic — matching, risk, funding, liquidations, compliance.
  • Findings requiring a modified or local build with security controls disabled (FIG_TLS_INSECURE=1, FIG_DEV_OPEN=1, or the *_insecure() APIs). These are documented development-only switches; a report that they disable a control is not a vulnerability, but reaching them in the default configuration is.
  • Denial of service via resource exhaustion on the reference simulator (fig-exchange-sim), which is not production infrastructure.

Hardening already in place

Documented per item in docs/SECURITY_AUDIT.md:

  • TLS 1.3 with server-certificate verification on by default; private-PKI pinning via FIG_TLS_CA; CA-verified mTLS (FIG_MTLS_CA).
  • Server-signed (HMAC-SHA256) session resumption tokens, verified before any state is restored; replays rejected inside the window, cluster-wide with Redis.
  • Bounds-checked frame, SBE, FIX, and TLV decoding, with frame_decode and sbe_decode fuzz targets in CI.
  • Connection resource limits (DoSGuard, ChannelRateLimiter) enforced on the receive path. Public marketdata/… REQUEST/SUBSCRIBE is additionally capped by tier (MdRateLimiter; SPEC §9.3).
  • Constant-time token comparison; JWT alg pinned to the expected algorithm.
  • Token signing-key rotation without downtime: docs/JWT_KEY_ROTATION.md.

There aren't any published security advisories