Open a private security advisory on GitHub or email the maintainer listed in the repository profile. Do not open a public issue for a vulnerability that could move funds.
contracts/src/ProofDrop.sol— escrow, commitment, seed capture, draw, settlement, refunds.apps/api— signature verification, entrant list, Merkle construction, orchestration.apps/web— wallet interactions, message construction, proof rendering.
The current entry model is one signed wallet address per draw plus an optional unverified handle. This is not sybil resistance. The documented next stage is an anonymous proof-of-personhood nullifier per draw via Very’s Palm ZK Proof or Liveness Detection; no biometric data should be stored. Privy is an embedded-wallet layer, not a proof-of-personhood system. See docs/anti-bot.md.
The full threat model is in the README’s Security model. The short version:
- The seed is a future X Layer block hash. The entrant list is committed before the seed block, but the block producer can theoretically influence the hash. This is disclosed, not hidden.
- The public entrant list is stored off-chain and anchored on-chain by its Merkle root. A lost database can be reconstructed only from a backup that matches the committed root.
- The live escrow has a designated committer. A missing or refusing committer can delay the draw until the refund path; a future version should make commitment permissionless against the public entry count.
- The TapeOut processor is an external contract. If its implementation is upgradeable, the
evalbehavior could change. High-value draws should pin and verify the processor implementation before escrow. - The live mainnet deployment uses the real TapeOut circuit. An earlier testnet rehearsal used a mock processor and is retained only in the README for reproducibility.
- There is no independent audit.
ProofDrop does not provide perfect sybil resistance, regulatory approval for paid-entry gambling, or a guarantee that a block producer is neutral. Entries are free.