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feat(host-cloudflare): ExecutorInternal service-binding entrypoint - #12
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Export a WorkerEntrypoint whose fetch serves the same app and MCP routes as the public fetch for workers in the same account that reach it over a service binding. The binding is the trust boundary, so a request carries no Access credentials: it acts as the configured delegator service, or as the subject named in X-Executor-Subject. The trusted mode lives on a config only the entrypoint builds, never on env or a request, so the public fetch cannot enter it.
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Adds a second door to the Cloudflare host: an
ExecutorInternalWorkerEntrypoint that a worker in the same account binds withentrypoint: "ExecutorInternal".ACCESS_DELEGATION_COMMON_NAME, the same rows that service token reaches through Access).X-Executor-Subject/X-Executor-Subject-Emailit acts for that person, same mapping asapplyDelegatedSubject. An email with no subject is rejected.loadConfig(env, { internal: true })). Nothing inenvor a request can put the publicfetchin that mode.Tests:
internalPrincipalcases, and both doors through the realmakeAccessVerifier(public rejects a delegation header with no assertion, internal accepts it). Mutation-checked: disabling the internal branch fails the door test.Deploy this before any caller declares the entrypoint binding.