Only the latest release receives security fixes. This is a personal fork maintained by one person, so please confirm you are on a current build before reporting.

Please do not open a public issue for a security report.

Private channels:

• GitHub private vulnerability reporting — Report a vulnerability
• Email — tokentracker-zzh@977744.xyz

Please include what the issue is, how to reproduce it, the version or commit you tested, your assessment of the impact, and a suggested fix if you have one.

Expect a first reply within a few days. This is a one-person project: a fix ships in the next release, and the report is credited in its notes unless you ask otherwise.

TokenTracker is local-first. The CLI reads AI-tool logs from your home directory, keeps token counts in ~/.tokentracker/tracker, and serves a dashboard on loopback. Everything cloud is opt-in: no account, no sync, and nothing leaves the machine unless you sign in and let it.

The parts worth attacking:

• src/lib/rollout.js — parses logs written by other tools. The rule is token counts and timestamps only; prompts, responses, file contents and tool arguments must never be retained, queued or uploaded. A parser that keeps message text is a security bug, not a feature request.
• src/lib/local-api.js — the local HTTP server. It binds 127.0.0.1:17890 and must never accept a connection from another host. It also serves GET /api/avatar-proxy, which fetches an image URL the user supplied; the private-address guard beside it is the reason that endpoint is safe, and a way around the guard is a reportable SSRF.
• src/lib/*-hook.js, init.js, uninstall.js — write into other tools' configuration. Anything that reads, overwrites or deletes files outside the paths it documents is a bug.
• dashboard/edge-patches/ — the cloud functions this fork deploys. They run with a service-role database client, so an authorisation mistake there exposes every account on the deployment. Ownership checks, "may this caller see this row", and anything that trusts a client-supplied user_id belong in this bucket.
• The desktop shells (TokenTrackerWin/, TokenTrackerBar/, TokenTrackerLinux/) bundle a Node runtime and start a local server. They must keep it on loopback and must not widen what their webview can reach.

• The anon key in src/lib/runtime-config.js is public by design: it ships in every build and only names the project. Finding it is not a vulnerability.
• The service-role key, the database password, the SMTP password and the leaderboard refresh secret must never appear in this repository, in a client bundle, or in a release artifact. If you find one, that is a critical report — say where, not what.
• The default backend URL points at this fork's own deployment. Sending data to it is a deliberate opt-in, and the ingest contract is documented in the README.

The foundational rule is unchanged: token counts and timestamps, never prompt or response content. Two values this fork added are stored in the cloud, and they are worth knowing about:

• Avatar URL — the image link you paste in Settings, stored with your profile and shown publicly while that profile is public.
• Display name and GitHub handle — same, and required for the leaderboard.

Both are opt-in (the profile has to be public), both are visible to anyone reading the leaderboard, and both can be cleared from Settings at any time.

• Anything that only reproduces after hand-editing files outside the documented data paths
• Already-disclosed dependency vulnerabilities — report those to the dependency
• Social engineering and other non-technical vectors
• Findings against the upstream project rather than this fork