Do not open a public issue. Use GitHub's private vulnerability reporting for this repository.

Useful in a report: a page (or a minimal HTML file) that reproduces it, what happens, the impact you see, and the version line from the bottom of snapii's menu or settings page. Expect a first response within a week. snapii is a small volunteer project in beta — there is no bounty, and no SLA beyond a genuine effort to fix real issues quickly and credit you. Only the latest release gets fixes.

snapii reads arbitrary, possibly hostile web pages and writes what it reads into a file that people open in a browser, into the clipboard, and into a link. Anything that turns page content into more than inert text and pixels is in scope:

• Active content in a saved SVG. Page text, titles, URLs, font names, alt text and link targets all end up in the file. A page that gets a <script>, an event-handler attribute, a javascript: or data: link, an external resource load or broken-out markup into the SVG is a vulnerability — the file is opened in a browser, often from the local disk.
• Active content on the clipboard. Copy text's HTML flavour is pasted into rich editors; anything in it that runs, loads, styles or tracks is in scope.
• A page escalating through the extension. The content script lives inside the page; a page that forges or tampers with messages to the background page (src/shared/messages.ts) to capture something you did not select, read another tab, write a file under a name or path it chose, or reach the extension's own pages.
• More in the file than you selected. Text the capture does not show (hidden elements, form field values, password fields, cross-origin frame content, other tabs) ending up in the SVG, the clipboard or the link.
• Anything leaving the browser. snapii promises no network requests at all and declares data_collection_permissions: none. A request of any kind — from the extension, the OCR engine or the saved file when opened — breaks that promise.
• Permission creep. snapii runs with activeTab, scripting, downloads, clipboardWrite and storage, and no host permissions. A way to act on a tab you did not click snapii in is in scope.
• The download file name. It is built from the page title (src/shared/filename.ts); a title that escapes the download directory or produces a dangerous file type is in scope.

• The page URL in the saved file. A saved SVG contains the full page URL with its query string, the page title, the capture time and a text-fragment link — by design and documented in the README's "Privacy" section and docs/details.md. Check a file before sharing it.
• A page blocking snapii. A page can, for example, pre-register snapii's custom-element names so the overlay does not appear. That is denial of service against yourself on that page, a known limitation, not a vulnerability.
• Pages Firefox protects. snapii cannot run on about: pages, the PDF viewer or addons.mozilla.org; that is Firefox's rule.
• Vulnerabilities in Firefox, tesseract.js or text-fragments-polyfill themselves — report those upstream. How snapii uses them is in scope.
• Viewers. How a third-party program renders or scripts SVG files in general.