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Security: cschmertz/deptime

SECURITY.md

Security policy

Please report vulnerabilities privately through GitHub's "Report a vulnerability" button on the Security tab (private vulnerability reporting). Don't open a public issue. You'll get an acknowledgement within a few days.

In scope

  • Index ingestion: anything that makes deptime ingest execute package code, escape the extraction directory, or accept a tampered artifact.
  • Index distribution: bypassing the manifest checksum or schema checks in deptime index pull, or the automatic refresh, or getting an index accepted by --verify that this repository's build workflow didn't produce.
  • Prompt injection through mined text: deprecation strings from third-party packages that could steer an agent (see docs/08).
  • The hosted server (deptime serve): request handling, rate limits, transport security settings.
  • The Claude Code plugin hook (integrations/claude-code/scripts/suggest_deptime.py).

Design notes

  • Local mode (deptime mcp) sends nothing anywhere. The only network request is downloading the prebuilt index from this repository's GitHub Releases.
  • Packages are never imported or executed during indexing. Analysis is static, with griffe and allow_inspection=False.

Verifying the index

Every published index has a signed build provenance attestation: build-index.yml signs index.sqlite.xz, index.sqlite.gz and manifest.json with Sigstore before uploading them, and uploads the signature bundle beside them as index.sigstore.json. The signature is recorded in Sigstore's public transparency log.

  • deptime index pull --verify installs the index only when the attestation verifies. It needs the GitHub CLI (gh) on PATH, but no GitHub login. gh attestation verify checks the signature, the certificate chain, the transparency-log entry and that the file is a subject, and DepTime then requires a certificate that names this repository's .github/workflows/build-index.yml on refs/heads/main, run on a GitHub-hosted runner. It compares these exactly itself, since gh before 2.102 matched --signer-workflow and --source-ref loosely. deptime index status shows the run and commit that built the installed file.

  • DEPTIME_VERIFY_INDEX=1 applies the same check to every download, including the automatic refresh of deptime mcp and deptime serve. A file that fails isn't installed, and the current index stays. An index installed earlier without the check stays in use until the next download, or until deptime index pull --verify checks it now.

  • By hand:

    gh release download index -R cschmertz/deptime -p index.sqlite.xz -p index.sigstore.json
    gh attestation verify index.sqlite.xz -R cschmertz/deptime --bundle index.sigstore.json \
      --signer-workflow cschmertz/deptime/.github/workflows/build-index.yml --source-ref refs/heads/main

What it proves: the file was built by this repository's workflow from a commit on main, not uploaded by hand or by another workflow or branch. It doesn't protect against a malicious commit on main itself; such a build would still be signed, but the signature would be public in the transparency log and name the commit.

There aren't any published security advisories