Please report vulnerabilities privately through GitHub's "Report a vulnerability" button on the Security tab (private vulnerability reporting). Don't open a public issue. You'll get an acknowledgement within a few days.
- Index ingestion: anything that makes
deptime ingestexecute package code, escape the extraction directory, or accept a tampered artifact. - Index distribution: bypassing the manifest checksum or schema checks in
deptime index pull, or the automatic refresh, or getting an index accepted by--verifythat this repository's build workflow didn't produce. - Prompt injection through mined text: deprecation strings from third-party packages that could steer an agent (see docs/08).
- The hosted server (
deptime serve): request handling, rate limits, transport security settings. - The Claude Code plugin hook (
integrations/claude-code/scripts/suggest_deptime.py).
- Local mode (
deptime mcp) sends nothing anywhere. The only network request is downloading the prebuilt index from this repository's GitHub Releases. - Packages are never imported or executed during indexing. Analysis is static, with griffe and
allow_inspection=False.
Every published index has a signed build provenance attestation: build-index.yml signs index.sqlite.xz, index.sqlite.gz and manifest.json with Sigstore before uploading them, and uploads the signature bundle beside them as index.sigstore.json. The signature is recorded in Sigstore's public transparency log.
-
deptime index pull --verifyinstalls the index only when the attestation verifies. It needs the GitHub CLI (gh) onPATH, but no GitHub login.gh attestation verifychecks the signature, the certificate chain, the transparency-log entry and that the file is a subject, and DepTime then requires a certificate that names this repository's.github/workflows/build-index.ymlonrefs/heads/main, run on a GitHub-hosted runner. It compares these exactly itself, sinceghbefore 2.102 matched--signer-workflowand--source-refloosely.deptime index statusshows the run and commit that built the installed file. -
DEPTIME_VERIFY_INDEX=1applies the same check to every download, including the automatic refresh ofdeptime mcpanddeptime serve. A file that fails isn't installed, and the current index stays. An index installed earlier without the check stays in use until the next download, or untildeptime index pull --verifychecks it now. -
By hand:
gh release download index -R cschmertz/deptime -p index.sqlite.xz -p index.sigstore.json gh attestation verify index.sqlite.xz -R cschmertz/deptime --bundle index.sigstore.json \ --signer-workflow cschmertz/deptime/.github/workflows/build-index.yml --source-ref refs/heads/main
What it proves: the file was built by this repository's workflow from a commit on main, not uploaded by hand or by another workflow or branch. It doesn't protect against a malicious commit on main itself; such a build would still be signed, but the signature would be public in the transparency log and name the commit.