Already paying for Claude Pro/Max? Use your subscription as an OpenAI-compatible API — $0 extra cost.
Open source from day one, used daily by my family, maintained on nights and weekends. If OCP saves you money too, you can ☕ buy me a coffee — full story below.
If OCP saves you a setup, a ⭐ helps other folks discover it. Issue reports are even more useful — that's the highest-quality feedback this project gets.
OCP turns your Claude Pro/Max subscription into a standard OpenAI-compatible API on localhost. Any tool that speaks the OpenAI protocol can use it — no separate API key, no extra billing.
Cline ──┐
OpenCode ───┤
Aider ───┼──→ OCP :3456 ──→ Claude CLI ──→ Your subscription
Continue.dev ───┤
OpenClaw ───┘
One proxy. Multiple IDEs. All models. $0 API cost.
- Why OCP? · Supported Tools
- Quickstart
- How It Works
- Reference: Available Models · API Endpoints · Environment Variables
- Modes & operations: LAN & multi-user →
docs/lan-mode.md· Subscription-pool (TUI) mode →docs/tui-mode.md· Upgrading →docs/upgrading.md - Built-in Usage Monitoring · Response Cache · Structured Outputs · Images / Multimodal · OpenClaw Integration
- Troubleshooting →
docs/troubleshooting.md - Repository Layout · Security · Governance · Support OCP · License
There are several Claude proxy projects. OCP picks a specific lane: align tightly with what cli.js actually does, observe + multiplex what's already there, don't extend the protocol. What you get:
- LAN multi-user keys (v3.7.0) — reach one Claude Pro/Max subscription from your own devices across the LAN. Each device gets a per-key API token (no OAuth session leak), with independent usage tracking and one-line revocation. Pro/Max are per-user accounts — see Sharing with family / a team — honest limits before extending access to other people.
ocp-connectone-shot client setup — one command on the client machine auto-configures OpenClaw, and detects Cursor, Cline, Continue.dev, and opencode to print ready-to-paste setup hints for each. No hunting for where each tool keeps itsOPENAI_BASE_URL.- Response cache with per-key isolation + singleflight (v3.13.0). Optional SHA-256 prompt cache, isolated per API key (cross-user pollution is impossible by hash construction, not by application logic), with stampede protection on concurrent identical prompts. Off by default. (PR #65, PR #66)
- Per-key request quotas (v3.8.0). Daily / weekly / monthly limits per key — set a kid's iPad to 20/day, a partner's laptop to 100/week. (PR #18)
- SSE heartbeat for long reasoning (v3.12.0, opt-in). If you've ever watched your IDE die at the 60s idle mark during a long Claude tool-use pause — that's nginx/Cloudflare default behavior. OCP emits an SSE comment frame to keep the connection alive without polluting the response. (PR #49)
cli.jsalignment + CI guardrail. LLM-assisted code drifts easily — it's tempting to invent plausible-looking endpoints thatcli.jsdoesn't actually use.ALIGNMENT.mdis binding: every endpoint OCP forwards fromcli.js(Class A) must cite acli.jsline. OCP's own compatibility surface — the OpenAI-compatible and administrative endpoints, which have nocli.jsanalogue — is Class B: it cites OpenAI's published specification (the OpenAI-compatible endpoints) or its authorizing ADR (the administrative ones), under the same anti-invention discipline (ADR 0006). Thealignment.ymlCI workflow blocks PRs that introduce known-hallucinated tokens. The payoff is boring: your setup keeps working whencli.jsships its next minor.models.jsonsingle source of truth (v3.11.0). Adding a model is one file edit; both/v1/modelsand the OpenClaw bootstrap derive from it. (PR #30)- Drives the official CLI as-is, no binary patching. OCP spawns the official
claudeCLI (or hosts it in an interactive tmux pane for TUI mode) — it does not extract OAuth tokens from memory, patch the binary, or invent protocol extensions. Traffic therefore looks like genuine Claude Code to Anthropic's classifiers (cc_entrypoint=cli). SeeALIGNMENT.mdfor why this constraint is load-bearing.
OCP and the alternatives serve adjacent but distinct needs. Pick the one that fits your use case:
| Feature | OCP | claude-code-router | anthropic-proxy |
|---|---|---|---|
| Forwards Claude Code subscription as OpenAI API | yes | yes | yes |
| Routes to multiple model backends (OpenAI, Gemini, etc.) | no | yes | partial |
| SSE heartbeat for long reasoning | yes (opt-in) | no | no |
| Per-key quota + LAN multi-user keys | yes | no | no |
| Response cache | yes (opt-in) | no | no |
| OpenClaw / IDE auto-config | yes | no | no |
| Model-routing rules / model-switching | no | yes | no |
| GitHub stars / ecosystem size | small | large | mid |
| Governance discipline (CI-enforced alignment with cli.js) | yes | n/a | n/a |
Plain English: claude-code-router is the routing-and-switching power tool — pick it if you want to mix Anthropic, OpenAI, Gemini, and local models behind one endpoint. anthropic-proxy is the minimal forwarder. OCP focuses on disciplined cli.js-aligned forwarding plus subscription multiplexing — pick it if you want to reach one Claude Pro/Max subscription from your own IDEs and devices, with LAN auth, quotas, and a governance contract that prevents endpoint drift.
OCP is Claude-only by design. If you want to spread across multiple LLM providers (not just Claude), see the sibling project OLP — Open LLM Proxy: the same spawn-the-provider-CLI approach, but across several provider CLIs behind one OpenAI-compatible endpoint, with intelligent fallback chains. It grew out of OCP in response to Anthropic's 2026-06-15 billing split — the idea being to spread subscription/quota risk across more than one provider. OCP remains the focused, Claude-only option; OLP is the multi-provider one.
OCP is single-maintainer + LLM-assisted, currently pre-1.0. It runs the maintainer's daily Claude Code workflow. If something breaks, open an issue.
Any tool that accepts OPENAI_BASE_URL works with OCP:
| Tool | Configuration |
|---|---|
| Cline | Settings → OPENAI_BASE_URL=http://127.0.0.1:3456/v1 |
| OpenCode | OPENAI_BASE_URL=http://127.0.0.1:3456/v1 |
| Aider | aider --openai-api-base http://127.0.0.1:3456/v1 |
| Continue.dev | config.json → apiBase: "http://127.0.0.1:3456/v1" |
| OpenClaw 1 | setup.mjs auto-configures |
| Any OpenAI client | Set base URL to http://127.0.0.1:3456/v1 |
The simplest path: ask your AI.
Paste this prompt to Claude Code / Cursor / Copilot:
Install OCP for me. Read README §Quickstart and follow it.
Tell me when I need to run `claude auth login`.
The AI will run git clone, npm install, node setup.mjs, and tell you when to OAuth.
Prerequisites: macOS, Linux or Windows (Windows runs the default -p path without auto-start — see Windows), Node.js 22.13+ or 23.4+ (Node 24+ is what CI and the reference fleet run), git, and the Claude CLI — new enough to have --system-prompt-file, which OCP passes on every spawn since v3.32.0. There is still no version floor — no minimum has been established, so this statement is deliberately version-free — but since #455 OCP checks the capability at boot and refuses to start if your CLI rejects a flag it passes, so you will find out at startup rather than on your first request — authenticated:
npm install -g @anthropic-ai/claude-code
claude auth login # prints a URL + code — open on any browser, sign in, paste code backInstall (Server role — runs the proxy):
git clone https://github.com/dtzp555-max/ocp.git
cd ocp
node setup.mjssetup.mjs verifies the Claude CLI, starts the proxy on port 3456, and installs auto-start (launchd on macOS, systemd on Linux). The ocp CLI lands at ~/ocp/ocp — symlink it onto your PATH (sudo ln -sf ~/ocp/ocp /usr/local/bin/ocp, or ln -sf ~/ocp/ocp ~/.local/bin/ocp) or alias it (alias ocp=~/ocp/ocp); the rest of the docs assume ocp is on your PATH.
Verify — should list exactly the ids in models.json (a count written here would go stale with every model added):
curl http://127.0.0.1:3456/v1/models
# claude-opus-5-5, claude-opus-5, claude-opus-4-8, claude-opus-4-7, claude-opus-4-6, claude-sonnet-5-5, claude-sonnet-5, claude-sonnet-4-6, claude-haiku-4-5-20251001Connect one IDE — point any OpenAI-compatible tool at the proxy, then reload your shell and start a tool (Cline / Continue / Cursor / OpenCode):
export OPENAI_BASE_URL=http://127.0.0.1:3456/v1See Supported Tools for per-tool config.
LAN / multi-user — reach OCP from your own devices, with per-key auth, quotas, and anonymous access:
node setup.mjs --bind 0.0.0.0 --auth-mode multiThe full LAN server + client handbook, headless (Pi / NAS / VPS) OAuth, key/quota/anonymous-access management, AI-assisted install prompts, and the deployment/security model live in docs/lan-mode.md. Claude Pro/Max are per-user accounts — read the honest limits of sharing before extending access to other people.
OCP runs natively on Windows 11 for the default -p path. Run the same install from PowerShell:
git clone https://github.com/dtzp555-max/ocp.git
cd ocp
node setup.mjs
.\start_ocp.cmdWhat differs from macOS/Linux:
claude.exeonly. OCP spawns the native executable, not a shell shim: it looks in%USERPROFILE%\.local\bin(where the native installer puts it), the WinGet and WindowsApps links, thenwhere claude, and skips anyclaude.cmd/extensionless match. If yours lives elsewhere, setCLAUDE_BINto the full path ofclaude.exe.- No auto-start, and setup does not start the proxy.
setup.mjswritesstart_ocp.cmdnext toserver.mjsinstead ofstart.sh. It runs the proxy in the foreground of its window and does nothing if the port is already listening; stop it with Ctrl+C or by closing the window. To start it at logon, create a Task Scheduler task for it yourself. - Environment variables are read from the environment the launcher inherits. Set them once with
setx NAME value(user scope) and open a new terminal before runningstart_ocp.cmd. - Not available on Windows: TUI mode (
CLAUDE_TUI_MODE=truerefuses to boot: it needs tmux and a/bin/shhook), and theocp/ocp-connectCLIs, which are bash scripts that callpython3. Use/health,/usageand the dashboard athttp://127.0.0.1:3456/dashboardinstead, and point clients at the proxy withsetx OPENAI_BASE_URL http://127.0.0.1:3456/v1. - Port already in use:
Get-NetTCPConnection -LocalPort 3456 -State Listen | Select-Object OwningProcess, thenStop-Process -Id <pid>. - Isolation works as on the other platforms: spawns run under
~\.ocp\spawn-home(OCP setsUSERPROFILEas well asHOME, becauseclaude.exereads its config directory fromUSERPROFILE), and an aborted request ends the wholeclaude.exeprocess tree viataskkill /T.
# From the cloned repo
node uninstall.mjsRemoves the launchd (macOS) or systemd (Linux) auto-start entry. Handles both legacy (ai.openclaw.proxy / openclaw-proxy) and current (dev.ocp.proxy / ocp-proxy) service names. Does not delete ~/.openclaw/, ~/.ocp/, or the cloned repo — remove those manually if desired.
Your IDE → OCP (localhost:3456) → claude --output-format stream-json CLI → Anthropic (via subscription)
OCP translates OpenAI-compatible /v1/chat/completions requests into claude --output-format stream-json CLI calls. Anthropic sees normal Claude Code usage — no API billing, no separate key needed.
Billing-policy status (as of 2026-07). Anthropic announced (2026-05-14) that from 2026-06-15 the
claude -p/ Agent SDK path would move to a separate metered credit pool — then paused the change on its effective date: "For now, nothing has changed: Claude Agent SDK,claude -p, and third-party app usage still draw from your subscription's usage limits" (official help article). So the default path above currently bills your subscription. Anthropic has said it will give notice before any future change; if the split re-lands, OCP's opt-in subscription-pool (TUI) mode is the ready-made hedge — see the billing table there.
OCP passes a client's OpenAI tools through to the model and returns its tool_calls (ADR 0022, v3.34.0). A request that declares tools is served by its own path: the spawn is given exactly those tools through an MCP bridge, and when the model chooses one the response carries choices[0].message.tool_calls — function.arguments as a JSON string, per the spec — with finish_reason: "tool_calls". The client runs the tool and sends the whole history back, including its tool message; OCP renders that history as text into the next spawn's prompt and the model answers or calls again. Every request is still one short-lived child; nothing is held across requests.
| Request | OCP |
|---|---|
tools with no tool_choice, or tool_choice "auto" |
bridged — the model holds exactly the declared tools (built-ins emptied); a call comes back as tool_calls, finish_reason: "tool_calls"; text comes back as before |
tool_choice "none" |
served on the plain path — the spec says the model will not call a tool, and text is the mandated outcome; not counted as dropped |
tool_choice "required", {"type":"function"}, {"type":"custom"}, or allowed_tools mode: "required" |
400 — the CLI cannot be forced, and a forced call the model does not make would be a silently wrong answer (ADR 0013's analysis, still in force) |
legacy functions / function_call |
functions is dropped and counted (reason legacy_functions_shape); function_call: {"name": …} is 400 |
tools together with response_format, or on the TUI lane |
dropped and counted, reason logged — see the boundary below |
Every drop increments /health's stats.toolRequestsDropped and logs openai_tools_dropped with a reason; every bridged call increments stats.toolCallsEmitted. With OCP_TOOL_CALLING=0 (see § Environment Variables) every declared tool is dropped and counted, which is the pre-3.34.0 behaviour.
One limit worth knowing before pointing an agent at OCP. A request that declares tools and asks for stream: true receives its response as SSE once the turn completes, not token by token.
Images and tools work together as of #477. They did not before: the multimodal spawn path did not render tool turns, so a vision agent was measured — with a real model — to re-call its tool indefinitely, and such requests were refused onto the plain path. That path now renders the same call/result/continuation text the text path does. Verified with a real model: fed its own tool result back with the image still in the history, the model answers from the result (no re-call) and describes the image.
The tools the bridge grants run on the client, so this works in every auth mode, including AUTH_MODE=multi: a guest calling its own tool touches nothing on the OCP host. What the model can do on the host itself is a separate question, governed by --allowedTools and OCP_LOCAL_TOOLS below — and when a request declares client tools, the host-side built-ins are emptied for that spawn so there is exactly one way to do each thing.
What this means for choosing OCP (workload fit). A coding agent on a client machine can use a LAN OCP when it declares its tools in the request (OpenAI tools). The model's calls come back as tool_calls, and the client runs them against its own files. (Before v3.34.0 this paragraph said the opposite, and it was true then: OCP dropped tools, and only the host's own tools existed.)
Two things still describe the host, not the client:
- The CLI's own environment section.
claudewrites the spawn's working directory (on an isolated spawn, the default,~/.ocp/spawn-home; otherwise the server's own directory), platform, shell and OS version into the system prompt itself, and no supported CLI flag removes it when OCP supplies the system prompt. Some models carry that path into the client's tool calls. Measured on 2026-10-29 with CLI 2.1.310:claude-haiku-4-5emitted awrite_filecall whose path was under the host's directory in 10 of 10 requests even when the client's own system message stated its working directory, whileclaude-sonnet-5-5used the client's directory. A sentence in OCP's prompt saying the section describes the host was tried and not shipped: it helped one case and madeclaude-opus-4-6worse in another (#532). If your agent depends on absolute paths, state its working directory in its system prompt, check which path the model you use actually follows, or have the agent resolve paths relative to its own root. - Host-side tools.
OCP_LOCAL_TOOLS, the TUI lane and the CLI's built-ins on a request withouttools(outsideAUTH_MODE=multi, which empties them) all act on the OCP host. For a coding agent that relies on those rather than on its own declared tools, runclaude(or a local OCP) on the machine where the code lives.
| Model ID | Context window | Notes |
|---|---|---|
claude-opus-5-5 |
1M | Most capable (default for opus alias) |
claude-opus-5 |
1M | Previous Opus, retained for pinning |
claude-opus-4-8 |
1M | Older Opus, retained for pinning |
claude-opus-4-7 |
1M | Older Opus, retained for pinning |
claude-opus-4-6 |
200k | Older Opus, retained for pinning |
claude-sonnet-5-5 |
1M | Latest Sonnet (default for sonnet alias) |
claude-sonnet-5 |
1M | Previous Sonnet, retained for pinning |
claude-sonnet-4-6 |
200k | Previous Sonnet, retained for pinning |
claude-haiku-4-5-20251001 |
200k | Fastest, lightweight (default for haiku alias) |
Context windows match the Claude Code CLI registry. Each model's prompt truncation ceiling is
derived from its own window (contextWindow × 3 chars) — see ADR 0011
and CLAUDE_MAX_PROMPT_CHARS in Environment Variables. Older messages are trimmed
to fit it; a request whose newest message alone does not fit is refused with 400 context_length_exceeded
rather than served without its question — see ADR 0024.
The canonical list lives in models.json — the single source of truth as of v3.11.0, validated in CI against models.schema.json. Both server.mjs (the /v1/models endpoint) and setup.mjs (the OpenClaw registration) derive from it. Adding a new model is now a one-file edit:
# 1. Edit models.json — add an entry
# 2. Bump version, commit, tag, push
# 3. Users get it on next `ocp update`:
# - OpenClaw: auto-synced via scripts/sync-openclaw.mjs
# - Cline / Aider / Cursor / opencode: live /v1/models, picks up immediately
# - Continue.dev: user edits their own config.json| Endpoint | Method | Description |
|---|---|---|
/v1/models |
GET | List available models |
/v1/chat/completions |
POST | Chat completion (streaming + non-streaming) |
/health |
GET | Comprehensive health check (includes a tui block for TUI-mode drift/concurrency monitoring, an auth block — see § "What auth.ok means" — and instanceName — see § "Running more than one instance on a host") |
/usage |
GET | Plan usage limits + per-model stats |
/status |
GET | Combined overview (usage + health) |
/settings |
GET/PATCH | View or update settings at runtime |
/logs |
GET | Recent log entries (?n=20&level=error) from the service log, ~/.ocp/logs/proxy.log (the old ~/.openclaw/logs/proxy.log is read only if that one does not exist) |
/dashboard |
GET | Web dashboard (always public) |
/api/keys |
GET/POST | List or create API keys (admin only). POST body must be a JSON object — {} auto-names, {"name":"…"} names; anything else is 400 (ADR 0017) |
/api/keys/:id |
DELETE | Revoke an API key (admin only) |
/api/keys/:id/quota |
GET/PATCH | View or set per-key quota (admin only) |
/api/usage |
GET | Per-key usage stats (?since=&until=&hours=&limit=); returns self only by default — pass ?all=true (admin only) for all-keys data |
/cache/stats |
GET | Cache statistics (admin only) |
/cache |
DELETE | Clear response cache (admin only) |
Sending one of these is not an error and never will be — a client that sets temperature: 0 out of habit still gets an answer. But OCP does not honour them, and since 3.37.0 it says so: each such request increments /health's stats.unhonouredFieldRequests and logs openai_fields_not_honoured at info with the field names.
| field | what happens |
|---|---|
n (≠ 1) |
one choice is returned |
logprobs, top_logprobs |
no logprobs in the response |
seed, stop, presence_penalty, frequency_penalty, logit_bias, max_completion_tokens |
no effect |
temperature, top_p, max_tokens |
no effect on generation — they are read only as cache-key material, so they partition the response cache. Reported separately as cacheKeyOnly. The OpenAI defaults (temperature: 1, top_p: 1, penalties 0, logit_bias: {}) are not reported: a client sending them gets default behaviour it cannot tell apart from what it asked for |
parallel_tool_calls: false |
calls are not serialised (true is honoured — see § tool calling) |
reasoning_effort none / minimal / a non-OpenAI value, or any value on the TUI lane |
no --effort flag; the CLI uses its default (see below) |
OpenAI's reasoning_effort is passed to the spawned CLI as claude --effort <level> for low, medium, high, xhigh and max — the five OpenAI values claude has a level for. none and minimal have no CLI level and are reported in the table above rather than rounded; so is any other value, which never reaches argv, so a typo cannot fail the spawn. Without the field the argv is unchanged. The level is part of the cache key, so answers at different efforts never share a slot. On the TUI lane the pane is booted before the request with OCP_TUI_EFFORT, so a per-request level cannot reach it and is reported instead. To confirm the level a request ran at, look for "effort" on its claude_spawned line in the proxy log (~/.ocp/logs/proxy.log for the service setup.mjs installs); the key is present only when --effort was passed.
These are not unwired fields, they are absent knobs. claude exposes no --max-tokens, --stop, --seed, --temperature or --top-p; its only budget flags are --max-budget-usd (a dollar cap) and --autocompact (the context window, not the output). Honouring them would mean OCP post-processing the model's output.
max_tokens deserves a second look if you are using it for cost control — it does not cap anything here. Use --max-budget-usd on the CLI side, or a per-key quota (§ API Keys), instead.
Since 3.35.0 the proxy returns 429 { "error": { "type": "rate_limit_error" } } for two different things. They are genuinely the same kind of answer — slow down — which is why they share a shape, and an ordinary 429 handler that backs off and honours Retry-After is correct for both. What differs is how long the wait is and whether waiting in this process can ever end it:
| cause | what it means | /health counter |
Retry-After |
can backing off clear it? |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| OCP is full | more requests are in flight and queued than CLAUDE_MAX_CONCURRENT + CLAUDE_MAX_QUEUE allow |
stats.queueRejections |
always present, and short — seconds | yes |
| the upstream wall | the Anthropic subscription or rate limit the spawned claude hit |
stats.upstreamRateLimits |
only when the upstream text said when | not within this process — it clears on the upstream's schedule, which can be hours |
So a client that only implements back off and retry is safe, not wrong. A client that can do better reads Retry-After when it is there and the message when it is not: usage limit / rate limit / hit your session limit text means the second row, and a client with somewhere else to go should go there rather than spend its retry budget on a wall that cannot move.
Choosing where to go is the client's job, not OCP's. The proxy reports the condition accurately and stops there; it does not retry against another upstream, switch providers, or hold a queue on your behalf. If you want failover, configure it in the agent framework or SDK that calls OCP.
The two counters are what an operator reads to tell "we hit the wall" from "the proxy is saturated" — a distinction stats.errors never made. Before 3.35.0 the second row was a 500 proxy_error, which told every client the proxy had broken.
One shape cannot carry the status, and which one is not what you would guess. With stream: true and no tools, the SSE headers go out before the spawn produces anything (so the heartbeat can cover the silent window), and a status cannot be un-sent — so an upstream wall arrives as an SSE error frame with 200. It is still counted in stats.upstreamRateLimits and logged with "lane":"streaming", so the operator view stays complete even though the status is not. See #482.
A streaming request that declares tools is not affected, and that is the shape agents actually send: with tool calling on (the default since 3.34.0) OCP completes the turn before it writes any SSE, so a wall still comes back as a real 429. Measured against a live 3.35.0 instance whose upstream fails with a wall:
| request | status | lane, in the proxy's own log (/logs) |
|---|---|---|
stream: true with tools |
429 | buffered |
stream: true without tools |
200 + SSE error frame | streaming |
So the blind spot is real but narrow: it needs stream: true, no tools — or OCP_TOOL_CALLING=0, or a request the tool path excludes (response_format, the legacy functions shape, tool_choice: "none").
| Variable | Default | Description |
|---|---|---|
CLAUDE_PROXY_PORT |
3456 |
Listen port (server-side). Also consumed by the OpenClaw ocp-plugin to dial the local proxy. |
OCP_PROXY_URL |
(unset) | Plugin-side full URL override (e.g. http://10.0.0.5:3456). Wins over CLAUDE_PROXY_PORT when both are set. Read by ocp-plugin/index.js only — server ignores it. |
CLAUDE_BIND |
127.0.0.1 |
Bind address (0.0.0.0 for LAN access) |
OCP_ALLOWED_HOSTS |
(empty) | Comma-separated host[:port] this proxy is served on. Only needed when a browser reaches it at a public DNS name — IP literals, localhost and *.local need no declaration because neither can be pointed at loopback by public DNS. Also required behind a reverse proxy that rewrites Host (nginx's default proxy_pass; Caddy preserves it). See ADR 0020. |
OCP_ALLOWED_ORIGIN_SCHEMES |
(empty) | Comma-separated origin schemes admitted outright, for browser extensions: moz-extension admits every Firefox extension, chrome-extension every Chromium one (Chrome, Edge, Brave). Every extension of that scheme can then use the proxy — and, with the default CLAUDE_ALLOWED_TOOLS, run tools on this machine — so to admit just one extension, put its id (the part after :// in its Origin) in OCP_ALLOWED_HOSTS instead; Firefox changes that id when the extension is reinstalled. http/https are refused. See ADR 0023. |
CLAUDE_AUTH_MODE |
none |
Auth mode: none, shared, or multi |
OCP_ADMIN_KEY |
(unset) | Admin key for key management (multi mode) |
CLAUDE_BIN |
(auto-detect) | Path to claude binary |
CLAUDE_TIMEOUT |
600000 |
Request timeout (ms, default: 10 min) |
OCP_TOOL_CALLING |
1 |
OpenAI tool calling over the MCP bridge (ADR 0022). 0 restores the pre-0022 behaviour: declared tools are dropped, answered as text, and counted in /health's stats.toolRequestsDropped with the reason logged. |
OCP_MULTIBLOCK_INPUT |
1 |
How the conversation is handed to claude -p (#512). By default each message is its own content block, sent over --input-format stream-json, and the tool-continuation note is part of the system prompt. A growing agent conversation then only ever appends blocks, so the prompt cache can match everything it has seen before and does not re-write it on every step. 0 restores the pre-#512 input byte for byte: one text block, with the note after the last tool result. Boot-time only. See § "Per-request tokens and prompt-cache hits" for how to see the effect. |
OCP_CACHE_BREAKPOINT |
1h |
The one prompt-cache breakpoint OCP adds, on the last block it sends, under OCP_MULTIBLOCK_INPUT (#512). 1h, 5m or off. The CLI already uses 3 of the API's 4 breakpoints and places one after ours, and a shorter TTL may not precede a longer one. So if the API refuses the breakpoint (a 400 naming cache_control), OCP logs cache_breakpoint_disabled and switches it off for the rest of the boot. The request that hit the 400 fails, and so does any request already in flight with a breakpoint (up to CLAUDE_MAX_CONCURRENT). Requests spawned after the switch run without it. Boot-time only. |
OCP_TOOL_TURN_QUIESCE_MS |
2000 |
Milliseconds to wait for the model's message-end signal after a tool call before ending the turn anyway. The healthy path never reaches it — the signal arrives first — so this is a ceiling on the degraded path, not a target: it bounds what happens if a claude build accepts --include-partial-messages but stops emitting stop_reason: "tool_use". Every openai_tool_calls log line records endedOn (signal / quiescence / close); a run of quiescence means re-measure. |
CLAUDE_HEARTBEAT_INTERVAL |
0 |
Streaming SSE keepalive interval (ms). 0 = disabled. See "Streaming heartbeat" below. |
CLAUDE_MAX_CONCURRENT |
8 |
Max concurrent claude processes (-p/stream-json path) |
CLAUDE_MAX_QUEUE |
16 |
Max requests waiting for a -p concurrency slot. Beyond CLAUDE_MAX_CONCURRENT, requests queue (up to this cap) instead of being rejected; when the queue is also full, the request gets HTTP 429 + Retry-After (not an opaque 500). Surfaced on /health.concurrency + /health.stats.queueRejections. |
CLAUDE_QUEUE_RETRY_AFTER |
5 |
Seconds advertised in the Retry-After header on a -p concurrency-overflow 429. |
CLAUDE_MAX_PROMPT_CHARS |
(derived per model) | Prompt budget in chars: older messages are trimmed to fit it, and a request whose newest message alone exceeds it is refused with 400 context_length_exceeded (ADR 0024). By default there is no single limit: each request is bounded by the named model's own contextWindow × 3 from the models.json SPOT — 3,000,000 for the native-1M models (claude-opus-5, -4-8, -4-7, claude-sonnet-5) and 600,000 for the 200k models (claude-opus-4-6, claude-sonnet-4-6, claude-haiku-4-5). Setting this env var (or ocp settings maxPromptChars) overrides the derivation absolutely, applying that one number to every model. See ADR 0011 (supersedes ADR 0009's single global ceiling). Note: very large prompts burn subscription-window quota quickly and slow TTFT; the TUI-mode paste path is untested beyond ~hundreds of KB. Applies to text only — image bytes bypass this budget (see Images / Multimodal). |
OCP_STRUCTURED_MAX_ATTEMPTS |
3 |
Max attempts (initial + retries) to coerce a schema-valid JSON reply when a request uses OpenAI response_format. Fail-closed: a non-numeric value keeps the default. See Structured Outputs. |
CLAUDE_AUTH_CHECK_INTERVAL_MS |
600000 |
How often the background claude auth status probe runs (ms, default: 10 min). Lower it for faster detection of a real credential outage — the verdict needs 2 consecutive conclusive rejections, so onset is reported within roughly one interval. Fail-closed parsing: an empty/garbage value keeps the default. Probe outcome is surfaced on /health.auth.lastOutcome (authenticated/token-present/rejected/timeout/unavailable) and the running tally on /health.auth.consecutiveFailures, so an operator can tell a host-load timeout from a real credential rejection. token-present is not authenticated — see § "What auth.ok means". See ADR 0010 and ADR 0014. |
CLAUDE_AUTH_CHECK_TIMEOUT_MS |
10000 |
Per-probe timeout for that same probe (ms). The probe runs asynchronously and never blocks request serving; this only bounds a stuck child. A probe killed by this timeout is inconclusive — it measures host load, not credentials, so it never changes /health.status or auth.ok. Fail-closed parsing: an empty/garbage value keeps the default. |
CLAUDE_CACHE_TTL |
0 |
Response cache TTL (ms, 0 = disabled). Set to e.g. 300000 for 5-min cache. See Response Cache. |
CLAUDE_ALLOWED_TOOLS |
Bash,Read,...,Agent |
Comma-separated tools to pre-approve |
CLAUDE_SKIP_PERMISSIONS |
false |
Bypass all permission checks |
CLAUDE_MCP_CONFIG |
(unset) | Path to an MCP server config JSON, passed to the spawned claude as --mcp-config (both the -p path and TUI OCP_TUI_FULL_TOOLS panes) |
CLAUDE_MAX_BODY_SIZE |
5242880 |
Max request body size, counted in characters (UTF-16 code units), not bytes — the body is accumulated as a JS string, so a multi-byte payload can be several times this size on the wire and still be admitted (5,242,880 CJK characters is ~15 MB). Base64 image payloads are ASCII, so for those the two counts coincide and the ~33% base64 inflation applies as written; raise this to admit larger multimodal requests. Fail-closed parsing: a garbage value keeps the default. |
CLAUDE_IMAGE_ALLOW_URL |
false |
Allow remote http(s) image URLs in image_url parts. Off by default (v1 supports base64 data: URIs only). When on, the URL is passed through to Anthropic as a url image source — OCP does not fetch it (no OCP-side SSRF surface); unreachable/blocked URLs surface as an API error. |
CLAUDE_MAX_IMAGE_BYTES |
5242880 |
Per-image decoded-byte cap (default 5 MB). Over-cap images get HTTP 413. |
CLAUDE_MAX_IMAGES |
20 |
Max image parts per request. Over-cap gets HTTP 413. |
CLAUDE_MAX_IMAGE_TOTAL_BYTES |
20971520 |
Aggregate decoded-byte cap across all images in a request (default 20 MB). Over-cap gets HTTP 413. |
CLAUDE_SYSTEM_PROMPT |
(unset) | Operator-wide system-prompt text appended (last) to every request's composed system prompt on the default -p path. TUI-mode panes are unaffected (they keep the interactive CLI's own system prompt). Echoed truncated on /health.systemPrompt. Note: changing this value and restarting auto-invalidates the response cache (the key carries a boot-config epoch, #177). |
OCP_LOCAL_TOOLS |
(unset) | Single-user, loopback only. =1 swaps the default "you have no local filesystem/shell access" system-prompt wrapper for a positive one telling the model it may use its tools. These are the server-side claude tools OCP spawns via -p (--allowedTools) — which, on a loopback instance, run on the operator's own machine, i.e. local tools. For a personal instance (e.g. an OpenClaw agent on its own local OCP) the default wrapper otherwise makes the model refuse to use tools it legitimately has. Changes only the prompt, never the tool surface (governed by --allowedTools/--disallowedTools; multi-tenant passes --tools "", which empties the built-in tool schema outright rather than enumerating what to deny). Unrelated to client-side tool_calls, which are supported since v3.34.0 regardless of this flag (see § Client-tools boundary): this flag is about what the model may do on the OCP host, and a request that declares client tools empties the host-side built-ins for that spawn anyway. Fail-closed: OCP refuses to boot if =1 is combined with CLAUDE_AUTH_MODE=multi, a non-loopback bind, or PROXY_ANONYMOUS_KEY (mirrors OCP_TUI_FULL_TOOLS, ADR 0007). Inert in TUI mode (the -p wrapper is unused there; the TUI tool surface is OCP_TUI_FULL_TOOLS) — a warning is logged. Off by default → the default path is byte-for-byte unchanged. Toggling it auto-invalidates the standard response cache (boot-config epoch, #177). |
CLAUDE_NO_CONTEXT |
false |
Suppress CLAUDE.md and auto-memory injection (pure API mode) |
PROXY_API_KEY |
(unset) | Bearer token for shared-mode authentication |
PROXY_ANONYMOUS_KEY |
(unset) | Well-known anonymous key (multi mode) — this exact string bypasses validateKey() and grants public access. Exposed via /health.anonymousKey only to localhost, or to all callers when PROXY_ADVERTISE_ANON_KEY=1. Full setup + security notes: docs/lan-mode.md § Anonymous Access. |
PROXY_ADVERTISE_ANON_KEY |
(unset) | When =1, advertise PROXY_ANONYMOUS_KEY in the public /health body for remote zero-config discovery. Default off — /health is unauthenticated, so this exposes the shared key to any LAN-reachable device (issue #109). Localhost always sees it regardless. |
CLAUDE_TUI_MODE |
false |
Opt-in, single-user only. Set to "true" to serve requests via interactive claude (cc_entrypoint=cli, subscription pool). Refuses to boot under AUTH_MODE=multi, and on Windows. See Subscription-pool (TUI) mode. |
CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN |
(unset) | OAuth bearer token — highest-precedence credential for the -p path, and the recommended credential for TUI-mode hosts (when set with OCP_TUI_HOME unset, OCP runs the TUI claude in a credential-isolated home). See docs/tui-mode.md and the permanent-401 fix. |
OCP_SPAWN_REAL_HOME |
(unset) | Kill-switch for the default -p/stream-json spawn-home isolation (latency fix). When unset and an OAuth token is resolvable, OCP runs the per-request claude spawn in a credential-free minimal scratch home ($HOME/.ocp/spawn-home, no .credentials.json/settings.json/plugins) with a neutral cwd and the env token — so it loads none of the operator's heavy global ~/.claude (plugins/skills/hooks) or the project CLAUDE.md, cutting per-request latency (measured ~10–28s → ~3–7s). Set to "1" to force the legacy real-HOME spawn (no cwd override) even when a token exists. With no resolvable token, OCP falls back to the real HOME automatically (zero regression). Active mode is shown at startup and on /health.spawn. |
CLAUDE_TUI_WALLCLOCK_MS |
120000 |
(TUI-mode) Maximum time in ms to wait for the native transcript to signal turn completion. Increase for long Opus thinking turns. |
OCP_TUI_CWD |
$HOME/.ocp-tui/work |
(TUI-mode) Scratch working directory where interactive claude sessions run. Transcripts land under <HOME>/.claude/projects/<encoded-cwd>/. Created automatically. |
OCP_TUI_HOME |
(auto) | (TUI-mode) HOME claude runs under. When unset, OCP auto-picks a credential-isolated scratch home (env token set) or the real home (no token). Full home/credential strategy: docs/tui-mode.md. |
OCP_TUI_ENTRYPOINT |
cli |
(TUI-mode) Billing-classifier labeling: cli pins cc_entrypoint=cli; auto self-classifies via TTY; off leaves inherited env untouched. See docs/tui-mode.md. |
OCP_TUI_EFFORT |
low |
(TUI-mode) --effort level for the interactive spawn (low/medium/high/xhigh/max/inherit). Explicit low cuts TTFT p50 ~40% vs an inherited xhigh; invalid values fall back to low. See docs/tui-mode.md. |
OCP_TUI_STREAM |
0 (off) |
(TUI-mode) =1 emits real SSE delta.content chunks (block-level) from claude's MessageDisplay hook instead of buffering; transcript stays authoritative and divergent turns are refused. Caveats (tool-using turns, zero-delta detection) in docs/tui-mode.md § OCP_TUI_STREAM. |
OCP_INSTANCE_NAME |
(empty) | Operator label for a NON-primary instance, reported on /health as instanceName. Empty means the primary. The server never branches on the value; ocp doctor reads the declaration off the unit file to tell a deliberate second instance from a leftover duplicate — see § "Running more than one instance on a host". |
OCP_TUI_STREAM_HOLDBACK |
100 |
(TUI-mode, streaming) Characters withheld before the first chunk — keeps the auth-banner gate alive and is the knob for tool-using turns. See docs/tui-mode.md § OCP_TUI_STREAM_HOLDBACK. |
OCP_TUI_STREAM_DIR |
$HOME/.ocp-tui/stream |
(TUI-mode, streaming) Directory for the hook script/settings + per-session delta sink (one sink per session-id, so concurrent turns never interleave). See docs/tui-mode.md. |
OCP_TUI_STREAM_POLL_MS |
100 |
(TUI-mode, streaming) Interval at which OCP drains the delta sink; the hook fires at block granularity so a finer poll buys nothing. See docs/tui-mode.md. |
OCP_TUI_MAX_CONCURRENT |
2 |
(TUI-mode) Max concurrent interactive TUI turns, independent of CLAUDE_MAX_CONCURRENT. Excess turns queue (bounded); a full queue yields 503. See docs/tui-mode.md. |
OCP_TUI_POOL_SIZE |
0 (off) |
(TUI-mode) Number of pre-booted warm claude panes (max 32) so a request skips the cold boot — measured p50 10.17s → 6.00s. Each warm pane is a live idle process; panes are single-use. Keep it small on a small host. See docs/tui-mode.md § OCP_TUI_POOL_SIZE. |
CLAUDE_CAPABILITY_PROBE_TIMEOUT_MS |
10000 |
Budget for the boot-time capability probe (#455). ~50× the measured cost (0.17–0.21 s), sized generously on purpose: overrunning it yields inconclusive, which warns and boots, so a tight value would silently turn the gate off on a loaded host rather than failing visibly. |
OCP_SKIP_CAPABILITY_PROBE |
(unset) | When =1, skip the boot-time claude capability probe (#455). The probe spawns claude once at startup with OCP's real spawn argv and a deliberately missing --system-prompt-file, and refuses to start only if the CLI answers unknown option '--<flag>' — i.e. only on observed absence. It costs no quota (no model turn; measured 0.18–0.21 s) and anything it cannot classify is logged as a warning and boots. Set this if you want to run against a CLI you know is missing a flag, and accept that every request will fail. |
OCP_SKIP_AUTH_TEST |
(unset) | When =1, skip the claude -p auth probe during setup.mjs. Under the announced (currently paused) 2026-06-15 billing split this probe would draw from the metered Agent SDK credit pool; set this to avoid burning a probe on re-installs or ocp update runs. Auth is validated at the first real request. |
OCP_TUI_FULL_TOOLS |
(unset) | (TUI-mode, single-user only) =1 grants the interactive session the same tool surface as the -p path (--allowedTools + optional --mcp-config) so a trusted single operator can run a tool-using / MCP agent on the subscription pool. Safe because TUI refuses to boot under AUTH_MODE=multi. See docs/tui-mode.md § OCP_TUI_FULL_TOOLS. |
OCP_TUI_TOOLS |
(unset) | (TUI-mode) Restrict which built-in tools the interactive pane may use, via claude --tools (e.g. Read,Glob,Grep,WebSearch,WebFetch). --tools is the tool-availability registry, not a permission layer, so an omitted tool is simply never offered and cannot hang a headless pane on an unanswerable permission prompt. Unset, empty or whitespace-only = all built-in tools available (default). Applies to the default MCP-walled surface only (not OCP_TUI_FULL_TOOLS, whose surface is CLAUDE_ALLOWED_TOOLS or its hardcoded default set). Narrows what the model is offered; it is not a trust boundary. See docs/tui-mode.md § OCP_TUI_TOOLS. |
OCP_DIR |
(auto) | Tooling only — the server never reads it. Absolute path to the OCP install directory, used by ocp doctor and ocp update. Normally unnecessary: the maintenance scripts resolve the install from their own file location, so an install at /opt/ocp, or one driven under sudo (where $HOME is /root), is found without configuration. Set it only to override that resolution. A relative value is refused (and the install_dir check is raised to WARN so you see the refusal). ocp doctor prints the directory it actually used — and where that answer came from — on its install_dir line either way. Not a free-form path: the fresh-install path starts with rm -rf <install dir>, so a directory is only accepted as a deletion target when it is absent, empty, or verifiably an OCP install (package.json named open-claude-proxy, or ≥2 of server.mjs/setup.mjs/ocp/models.json); anything else is refused before any step runs. See Troubleshooting § "ocp update wants a fresh install". |
/health's auth block answers "can this proxy authenticate", and it is deliberately conservative about saying yes. Two pairs of fields, deliberately separate: okSource / okAt say how and when auth.ok was established, while lastOutcome / lastCheck describe the last probe. A probe that cannot conclude updates only the second pair.
The table is keyed on okSource, because that is the field the verdict's meaning turns on. lastOutcome describes the probe, and the probe is not always what set auth.ok.
okSource |
auth.ok |
lastOutcome |
what was actually established |
|---|---|---|---|
none |
null |
none |
no probe has completed yet — the state at boot |
probe |
true |
authenticated |
the probe ran and the child resolved its own credential from a file or the keychain |
probe |
null |
token-present |
a token was in the child's environment and the probe exited 0. That proves presence, not validity |
probe |
false |
rejected |
the probe ran to completion and the credential was refused |
request |
true |
preserved | a real completion succeeded — the strongest evidence available, and free |
expired |
null |
preserved | a request established it, but longer ago than the freshness window: "it worked; we do not know now" |
lastOutcome is not part of the request-verified verdict, and that is deliberate. A completed request sets okSource: "request" and leaves lastOutcome exactly as the probe last set it — overwriting it would make /health claim a probe ran when none did. So on a host that supplies the token through the environment, the steady state is okSource: "request" + lastOutcome: "token-present", and that pairing is normal rather than contradictory. It is also the state three of the four instances in the reference fleet spend most of their time in.
There is no
lastOutcome: "verified-by-request". Earlier revisions of this table, of ADR 0014 and of the CHANGELOG all promised one; the server has never emitted it and by design never will (see the paragraph above). A monitor written against that value could not match any real response. Key onokSource: "request". Corrected in #342.
Inconclusive probes are not a row here, because they leave the verdict alone: a timeout or unavailable writes lastOutcome, lastCheck, message and consecutiveInconclusive, and leaves ok, okSource and okAt untouched. That is the point — a probe killed by host load measured load, not the credential.
Why token-present is not authenticated. claude auth status exits 0 whenever a token is present, without checking it: a fabricated token yields exit 0 and loggedIn: true. On a host that supplies CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN through a systemd EnvironmentFile or an inlined unit — which is how OCP is normally deployed on Linux — the probe therefore cannot distinguish a working credential from an expired one. Reporting authenticated there is what issue #308 found: /health asserting the proxy was authenticated while every request failed on authentication. See ADR 0014.
A null is not a failure. It means no conclusive verdict, ocp doctor reports it as WARN rather than FAIL, and it does not block ocp update. On such a host the first successful request moves it to true.
auth.ok never moves status. proxyHealthStatus reads consecutiveFailures and never ok, so no verdict in the table above can flip a host to degraded.
The tally it reads is a different matter, and this is the part worth knowing. Conclusive probe rejections raise consecutiveFailures (ADR 0010), and any successful request clears it — a deliberate restoration of ADR 0010's self-heal, unqualified by which lane served the request (see ADR 0014 § Consequences). So a host reporting degraded can return to ok on the first request that succeeds, with no probe having run in between. If you are debugging status — ocp update's post-flight check and the dashboard's status card both read it, and the dashboard has no other auth signal — do not assume it is probe-driven only.
(This paragraph said "status is unaffected by any of this … never by auth.ok" until #361. The second clause was true and the bolded headline was not: it read as though nothing in this section could touch status, while a successful request has always cleared the tally that decides it.)
DEFAULT_PORT (3456) is the primary and never changes — it is the single source of truth in lib/constants.mjs, and CI hard-fails any other port literal in source. A host that needs a second instance takes DEFAULT_PORT + n in allocation order, and must declare itself:
# /etc/systemd/system/ocp-<name>.service
Environment=OCP_INSTANCE_NAME=<name>
Environment=CLAUDE_PROXY_PORT=3457
Environment=CLAUDE_BIND=127.0.0.1
User=<the identity this instance's spawns should have>The name appears on /health as instanceName (empty string on the primary), so an instance is discoverable from the outside rather than only by reading the box's unit files.
The reason a second instance exists at all is Unix identity, not load. OCP spawns a claude child per request and that child inherits the service's identity. An agent that answers untrusted users therefore needs its own instance under its own user — otherwise a prompt injection runs with whatever the primary's account can do. This cannot be solved inside one process: the spawn identity comes from the unit's User=, so it is one identity per unit.
Two things this convention exists to prevent, both of which happened:
- A version sweep that probes only
:3456reports the fleet clean while a second instance sits a release behind. Enumerate declared instances, not hosts. ocp doctor's multi-unit check could not tell a deliberate second instance from a leftover duplicate, so it warned on a correct configuration every run — and a warning that always fires is one people learn to skip. On the host that reported this, a genuine leftover duplicate was sitting next to the intended instance and the permanent false alarm is what buried it.
What ocp doctor does with the declaration. The multi-unit check reads OCP_INSTANCE_NAME from each unit file — Environment= on systemd, the EnvironmentVariables dict in a launchd plist — never from /health. That is deliberate: doctor runs before and around a restart, and a leftover duplicate is typically enabled but not running, so the live endpoint cannot see the one thing the check exists to find. A host's enabled OCP units are resolved when every unit is distinguishable from every other by both the port it binds and the identity it claims. On a host with more than one enabled OCP unit, doctor then reports one of three things (a host with one unit, or none, says nothing — the question never arises):
| What it finds | What it says |
|---|---|
| Two or more units on the same port | WARN — a boot race, exactly as before. A declaration never silences this: two processes cannot share a port however well they are labelled. |
| Two or more units claiming the same identity on different ports | WARN — undeclared multiplicity. Both can start, so nothing breaks loudly; the host simply cannot say which is intended. An absent OCP_INSTANCE_NAME is a claim to be the primary, so two undeclared units collide here. |
| Every unit distinct on both | INFO — a one-line inventory ("ocp.service" :3456 (primary), "ocp-wifibot.service" :3457 ("wifibot")), so "verified correct" and "nothing looked" are not the same silence. |
Declaring the extra instance is therefore the cheaper of the two remedies — it costs one Environment= line and loses nothing — and disabling the unit you did not want is the other. doctor nominates neither: which one is intended is not something it can know.
When CLAUDE_HEARTBEAT_INTERVAL is set to a positive integer (milliseconds), OCP emits an SSE comment frame (: keepalive\n\n) on streaming responses whenever the stream has been idle for that duration. The timer resets on every real chunk, so heartbeats only fire during genuine silent windows (for example, Claude CLI tool-use pauses of 30s–5min, or a long "processing large contexts" delay before the first token).
Use cases: downstream HTTP clients or load balancers with idle-connection timeouts that would otherwise abort a slow-but-alive request. CLAUDE_HEARTBEAT_INTERVAL=30000 (30s) is a reasonable starting value if your downstream has a 60s idle timeout.
Heartbeats are inert SSE comment lines — conforming SSE clients ignore them. If your downstream client's SSE parser crashes on comment frames, leave this disabled (the default) and file an issue so we can consider an alternate frame format.
OCP also sends X-Accel-Buffering: no on SSE responses so nginx-default proxy buffering does not hold heartbeats in an upstream buffer.
Many tunables can be changed live via ocp settings <key> <value> (or PATCH /settings) without restarting:
$ ocp settings maxPromptChars 200000
✓ maxPromptChars = 200000
$ ocp settings maxConcurrent 4
✓ maxConcurrent = 4
maxPromptChars is a global override: setting it pins the truncation ceiling to that one
number for every model, replacing the per-model derivation. Left unset, ocp settings reports
the fallback (600,000) and each model uses its own contextWindow × 3. There is no way to
clear the override back to per-model derivation over PATCH — restart without
CLAUDE_MAX_PROMPT_CHARS to do that. See ADR 0011.
Run OCP as a server on an always-on device and reach your one Claude Pro/Max subscription from your own laptops, phones, and Pis across the LAN — with per-key API tokens, per-key usage tracking + quotas, response-cache isolation, and one-command client setup (ocp connect / ocp-connect). A shared anonymous key covers simple trusted-family sharing.
node setup.mjs --bind 0.0.0.0 --auth-mode multi
ocp keys add laptop # then: ocp lan → prints the LAN IP + connect commandclaude runs with the operator's filesystem access and is not sandboxed per key, so only share with people you fully trust, on a trusted network. Pro/Max are per-user accounts; pooling across distinct people may violate Anthropic's ToS.
Full server + client handbook, headless OAuth, AI-assisted install prompts, key/quota/anonymous-access management, monitoring dashboard, and the deployment/security model & honest limits: docs/lan-mode.md.
Opt-in, single-user only. CLAUDE_TUI_MODE=true serves requests through interactive claude (no -p, cc_entrypoint=cli) so they bill the Pro/Max subscription pool instead of the metered Agent SDK path. Because claude runs with the operator's filesystem access, it is single-operator only — never enable it on a multi-user OCP (it refuses to boot under AUTH_MODE=multi).
⚠️ Status (as of 2026-07): a hedge, not a necessity. The 2026-06-15 billing split that made this matter was announced, then paused on its effective date — the default-ppath currently bills your subscription. TUI-mode is kept ready for if/when a reworked change lands (Anthropic has promised advance notice).
Setup, the ~6-second latency floor, real-SSE streaming (OCP_TUI_STREAM), the warm-pane pool (OCP_TUI_POOL_SIZE), full-tool mode (OCP_TUI_FULL_TOOLS), /health drift monitoring, and the flip/canary runbooks: docs/tui-mode.md.
Run ocp update — it smart-picks the path. If the tree is already at the latest release but the running service is stale (e.g. a previous update was interrupted before it restarted), it takes a restart-only path: no git/npm changes, just a restart + post-flight /health verification. A patch bump (e.g. v3.21.0 → v3.21.1) takes the light path (git pull + npm install + restart); a cross-minor jump (e.g. v3.18 → v3.22) takes the full path (pre-flight, snapshot, setup.mjs --reconfigure-only — writes the service unit/plist with env-merge but does not itself start anything — then a dedicated restart phase, then post-flight /health + /v1/models verification). ocp update --check shows available updates without applying.
Manual flags, rollback (ocp update --rollback), snapshots, and the OpenClaw model auto-sync (v3.11.0+): docs/upgrading.md.
Check your subscription usage from the terminal:
$ ocp usage
Plan Usage Limits
─────────────────────────────────────
Current session 21% used
Resets in 3h 12m (Tue, Mar 28, 10:00 PM)
Weekly (all models) 45% used
Resets in 4d 2h (Tue, Mar 31, 12:00 AM)
Extra usage off
Model Stats
Model Req OK Er AvgT MaxT AvgP MaxP
──────────────────────────────────────────────────────
opus 5 5 0 32s 87s 42K 43K
sonnet 18 18 0 20s 45s 36K 56K
Total 23
Proxy: up 6h 32m | 23 reqs | 0 err | 0 timeout
Web Dashboard: open http://<host>:3456/dashboard in any browser for real-time per-key usage, request history, plan utilization, and system health (screenshot + details in docs/lan-mode.md § Monitoring).
Each spawn's cost is on its log lines in the proxy log (~/.ocp/logs/proxy.log for the service setup.mjs installs). The values are read from the claude CLI's own stream-json events, and OCP computes nothing itself:
| event | fields | what they tell you |
|---|---|---|
claude_ok |
inputTokens, outputTokens, cacheWriteTokens, cacheReadTokens |
The four counts from the CLI's result.usage. inputTokens is only the uncached remainder. The whole prompt is the sum of the three input fields. A conversation that re-writes itself into the cache on every call shows a large cacheWriteTokens and a cacheReadTokens that never grows (#512). Absent when the CLI reported no usage, for example on a tool turn, whose spawn is ended before its result event. |
claude_spawned |
systemPromptSha, toolsSha (tool requests only), blockCount |
The first 12 hex characters of sha256 of the system prompt and of the declared tools, plus the number of content blocks sent. The prompt cache matches tools, then system, then messages, in that order. So if a sha changes between two requests of one conversation, that layer invalidated everything after it. Content is never logged. |
claude_stream_event (type: "rate_limit_event") |
info.status, info.rateLimitType, info.resetsAt, info.windows.<name>.utilization |
The CLI's own view of the subscription windows (five_hour, seven_day), per spawn. A shape OCP does not recognise is logged as the old 200-character data prefix instead. |
Why an agent's prompt can be cached at all (#512, OCP_MULTIBLOCK_INPUT, OCP_CACHE_BREAKPOINT). Anthropic's prompt cache matches a request's prefix at content blocks. OCP used to flatten the whole conversation into one block, and a block that grows at its end never matches the previous request's block, so every step of an agent loop re-wrote the entire conversation into the cache. Two changes, both needed:
- One block per message. Consecutive tool results share one block, and the "results are final" note moves into the system prompt, where it is byte-constant. As a trailing block, it moved to the new end on every step.
- One cache breakpoint on the last block OCP sends. The CLI's own final breakpoint lands on a block it appends after OCP's content. The entry it writes is therefore never a prefix of the next request, and on opus 5.5 and sonnet 5 nothing else finds it. (haiku 4.5 happened to recover through the API's short lookback. The Claude 5 models did not.) An entry that ends on OCP's last block is a prefix of the next request, and the lookback finds it.
Measured on opus 5.5 through OCP, with reasoning_effort: low and the tool bridge (#512):
| per step | written to cache | read from cache |
|---|---|---|
| before | ~13.5k (the whole conversation) | ~0.6k |
| now | ~240 | the whole previous prompt |
What this does not cover:
- A conversation over the model's prompt budget keeps the text path's whole-message truncation. Once old messages are dropped, the start of the prompt shifts on every turn and nothing can cache.
- A client that sends one tool result at a time within a single step extends the last block instead of appending one, so that one step misses.
The fields are read from claude 2.1.280's event shapes. They are not a documented contract, so if a CLI upgrade removes them, the keys disappear from these lines rather than holding wrong values.
ocp usage Plan usage limits & model stats
ocp usage --by-key Per-key usage breakdown (LAN mode)
ocp status Quick overview
ocp health Proxy diagnostics
ocp keys List all API keys (multi mode)
ocp keys add <name> Create a new API key
ocp keys revoke <name> Revoke an API key
ocp connect <ip> One-command LAN client setup
ocp doctor Health & upgrade-readiness check; primary entry for AI-driven debugging. --json produces a next_action for AI agents.
ocp lan Show LAN connection info & IP
ocp settings View tunable settings
ocp settings <k> <v> Update a setting at runtime
ocp logs [N] [level] Recent logs (default: 20, error)
ocp models Available models
ocp restart Restart proxy
ocp restart gateway Restart gateway
ocp update Update to latest version
ocp update --check Check for updates without applying
ocp --help Command reference
Note: Terminal CLI uses
ocp <command>; the OpenClaw gateway plugin exposes the same as/ocp <command>in Telegram/Discord (see OpenClaw Integration).
OCP can cache responses to avoid redundant Claude CLI calls for identical prompts — useful during development when the same prompt is sent repeatedly.
Enable by setting CLAUDE_CACHE_TTL (ms), or update at runtime with ocp settings cacheTTL 300000:
export CLAUDE_CACHE_TTL=300000 # cache responses for 5 minutesHow it works:
- Cache key = SHA-256 of one JSON document (
"v3",<keyId or "anon">, model, temperature, max_tokens, top_p, reasoning_effort, config epoch, structured-output descriptor, messages). Each message is hashed whole —role,content,tool_calls,tool_call_id,nameand any other field the client sends — so two histories that differ only in a tool call's arguments never share a slot - Per-key isolation — different API keys never share cache entries; anonymous callers share one
anonpool - Cache hits return instantly — no Claude CLI process spawned. Streaming hits are replayed as multiple SSE chunks (80 codepoints each), not one large delta, so incremental render is preserved
cache_controlbypass — a request carrying an Anthropiccache_controlannotation (top-level or nested incontent[]) skips OCP's cache entirely, so it doesn't interfere with Anthropic-side prompt caching- Singleflight stampede protection — concurrent identical cache-miss requests share one upstream
cli.jsspawn; followers receive byte-identical responses (non-streaming path only; streaming-path singleflight is a known TODO) - Multi-turn conversations (with
session_id) are never cached; expired entries are reaped automatically every 10 minutes
Management:
curl http://127.0.0.1:3456/cache/stats # { "entries": 42, "totalHits": 156, "sizeBytes": 284000, "inflight": 0, "requesters": 0 }
curl -X DELETE http://127.0.0.1:3456/cache # clear all cached responses
ocp settings cacheTTL 0 # disable at runtimeCache is disabled by default (CLAUDE_CACHE_TTL=0). All data is stored locally in ~/.ocp/ocp.db. Cache keys resolve model aliases as of v3.25.0: a request for an alias (opus, sonnet, haiku, or a legacy alias like claude-haiku-4-5) is now keyed on the canonical model it resolves to, not on the string the client sent. Two consequences, both one-time and self-healing: rows written before the upgrade don't match the new lookups, so they orphan and are reaped by the TTL cleanup interval within one window — no migration script required; and an alias now correctly shares a cache slot with its canonical id, since both produce an identical spawn. Scope: for the normal cache only alias-addressed rows rekey — rows keyed on a literal model id keep matching, unless you run OCP_LOCAL_TOOLS=1, in which case the whole normal cache rekeys once because v3.25.0 also reworded that wrapper and the wrapper text feeds the config epoch. Every structured-output row rekeys regardless, since the same change folds the config epoch into the structured key, which it previously omitted. This is what makes an alias repoint (such as v3.25.0's opus → claude-opus-5) take effect immediately instead of being masked by the cache until TTL expiry. Hash format upgrade in v3.13.0: legacy v1 cache rows don't match new v2-format lookups; they orphan and are reaped by the TTL cleanup interval within one window — no migration script required. Hash format upgrade in the first release after v3.42.0: the key became one framed JSON document (v3), so v2 rows don't match new lookups; they orphan and are reaped the same way, and the cache starts cold once.
/v1/chat/completions honors OpenAI's response_format parameter so OpenAI-SDK clients that require machine-parseable JSON (Home Assistant AI Tasks, Honcho, BYO scripts) get JSON in choices[].message.content — not prose.
Supported shapes:
response_format: { "type": "json_schema", "json_schema": { "name", "strict", "schema" } }response_format: { "type": "json_object" }json_mode: true— non-standard top-level alias honored by several OpenAI-compatible clients; treated asjson_object.
When a structured request is detected, OCP:
- Appends a strict JSON-only steering instruction to the request (no Markdown, no fences, no prose, must begin with
{or[). - Extracts the JSON from the model reply (unwraps a stray code fence / prose via a string-aware balanced slice).
- For
json_schema, validates the result against the supplied schema (types,required,enum,const,additionalProperties, nullability,items,min/maxItems, and$ref/$defs+allOf/anyOf/oneOfcomposition — the shapes the official OpenAI SDK emits viazodResponseFormat/client.beta.chat.completions.parse). Forjson_object, the whole reply must parse as a single JSON value (a stray brace inside prose is not served as the answer). - On a parse/validation miss, retries with a stronger instruction that names the failure, up to
OCP_STRUCTURED_MAX_ATTEMPTS(default 3). - If no valid JSON can be produced, returns OpenAI's assistant
refusalfield (HTTP 200,message.content: null,message.refusal: "<reason>",finish_reason: "stop") — the spec's own mechanism for "the model would not produce the required output" — rather than an invented error type or passing prose through. SDK clients take their writtenrefusalbranch.
A reply that carries more than one top-level JSON value (e.g. Schema: {…} then Answer: {…}) is rejected as ambiguous rather than silently serving the first — OCP never serves an unvalidated or arbitrarily-chosen extraction.
message.content for a structured request is the raw JSON string only — no fences, no reasoning, no wrapper. Non-structured requests are completely unaffected (normal conversational behaviour, streaming included). This is a Class B.1 endpoint extension authorized by ADR 0006; the pure logic lives in lib/structured-output.mjs and is unit-tested in test-features.mjs.
Caching & cost. A structured request can cost up to OCP_STRUCTURED_MAX_ATTEMPTS metered claude spawns — each retry is a fresh spawn, burning subscription-window quota today and metered credits if the (currently paused) 2026-06-15 billing split re-lands (see the billing-policy status note in How It Works) — so this feature adds cost-attack surface. Two guards bound it: (a) identical concurrent structured requests share one flight (single-flight dedup, so N callers ≠ N× spawns), and (b) when CLAUDE_CACHE_TTL > 0, a validated result is cached on a structured-keyed hash (the response_format/schema is folded into the key, so a JSON reply never collides with the conversational answer and different schemas never share a slot). A refusal is never cached. Operators concerned about cost can lower OCP_STRUCTURED_MAX_ATTEMPTS to 1 (no retries) or gate the surface behind per-key quotas (/api/keys/:id/quota).
POST /v1/chat/completions accepts OpenAI-style multimodal content parts, so a
message can carry images alongside text and Claude will actually see them. This
follows OpenAI's vision /
chat-completions image_url
request shape — no OCP-invented fields. (Class B.1 endpoint; see ADR 0006.)
Under the hood, when a request carries an image OCP feeds the conversation to the
Claude CLI as Anthropic image blocks over --input-format stream-json. Text-only
requests are completely unaffected (unchanged code path).
- Base64 data URIs (default, recommended):
data:image/png;base64,<...>. Media types:image/jpeg,image/png,image/gif,image/webp. - Remote
http(s)URLs — off by default. SetCLAUDE_IMAGE_ALLOW_URL=1to enable; the URL is passed through to Anthropic (OCP never fetches it itself, so there is no OCP-side SSRF surface). - Images may appear in any message in the history (multi-turn), not just the last one.
- Non-image, non-text parts (audio, files) are not yet supported and are
replaced with a
[non-text content omitted]placeholder (deferred to a future version).
curl -X POST http://127.0.0.1:3456/v1/chat/completions \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d '{
"model": "claude-sonnet-4-6",
"messages": [{
"role": "user",
"content": [
{ "type": "text", "text": "What is in this image?" },
{ "type": "image_url",
"image_url": { "url": "..." } }
]
}]
}'Multimodal images require the default -p spawn path. In TUI / subscription-pool
mode (CLAUDE_TUI_MODE=true) the CLI is driven interactively and cannot carry
image blocks, so a request with an image_url part returns 400 images_unsupported_in_tui_mode rather than silently dropping the image and
answering about something the model never saw. Remove the images, or run OCP
without TUI mode, to use vision.
Images must also live in a user or assistant message, not a system message
(system content is not forwarded to the CLI as image blocks). An image_url part
present only in a system message returns 400 images_unsupported_in_system_messages
for the same reason — fail loudly rather than answer about an unseen image. This matches
the OpenAI vision spec, which does not place images in the system role.
Images bypass the text CLAUDE_MAX_PROMPT_CHARS budget and are instead bounded by
their own byte/count caps. The text in a multimodal request is still subject to
CLAUDE_MAX_PROMPT_CHARS (older text is truncated exactly as on the text-only
path — only the image bytes are exempt; a newest message whose text alone exceeds the
budget is refused with 400 context_length_exceeded, as on the text path). All numeric caps are parsed fail-closed:
a malformed value (e.g. CLAUDE_MAX_BODY_SIZE=unlimited or =5MB) is rejected with
a startup warning and the safe default is kept — a misconfigured cap can never
silently disable the guard. Requests that violate a cap get a clear 4xx (never a
silent drop):
| Cap | Env var | Default | Error |
|---|---|---|---|
| Request body | CLAUDE_MAX_BODY_SIZE |
5,242,880 characters | 413 request body too large |
| Per-image bytes | CLAUDE_MAX_IMAGE_BYTES |
5 MB | 413 image_too_large |
| Total image bytes | CLAUDE_MAX_IMAGE_TOTAL_BYTES |
20 MB | 413 images_too_large |
| Image count | CLAUDE_MAX_IMAGES |
20 | 413 too_many_images |
| Unsupported media type | — | — | 400 unsupported_image_type |
| Malformed data URI | — | — | 400 invalid_data_uri |
| Remote URL while disabled | CLAUDE_IMAGE_ALLOW_URL |
off | 400 remote_url_disabled |
Base64 payloads are large: a 5 MB image is ~6.7 MB as a data URI, so raise
CLAUDE_MAX_BODY_SIZE (and, if needed, CLAUDE_MAX_IMAGE_BYTES) to admit big
images. Vision support depends on the target model — request a current
vision-capable Claude model.
OCP was originally built for OpenClaw and includes deep integration:
setup.mjsauto-configures theclaude-localprovider inopenclaw.jsonat install timeocp updateauto-syncs theclaude-localmodel registry frommodels.json(v3.11.0+) — no more stale model dropdowns after upgrades- Gateway plugin registers
/ocpas a native slash command in Telegram/Discord - Multi-agent — 8 concurrent requests sharing one subscription
- No conflicts — uses neutral service names (
dev.ocp.proxy/ocp-proxy) that don't trigger OpenClaw's gateway-like service detection
Install the gateway plugin:
cp -r ocp-plugin/ ~/.openclaw/extensions/ocp/Add to ~/.openclaw/openclaw.json, then openclaw gateway restart:
{
"plugins": {
"allow": ["ocp"],
"entries": { "ocp": { "enabled": true } }
}
}After installing, use /ocp slash commands in your chat: /ocp status, /ocp usage, /ocp models, /ocp health, /ocp keys, /ocp keys add <name>, /ocp keys revoke <name>.
/usage answers 502 (or ocp usage reports an HTTP error) while chat works. Since 3.37.0 the proxy logs credential_source_selected when it passes over an expired credential source in favour of a valid one — look for "skippedExpired":["file"]. That means a stale ~/.claude/.credentials.json (the Linux-style file) is sitting next to a live macOS keychain entry; on macOS nothing rewrites that file, so it never self-heals. The proxy now picks the valid source anyway; removing the stale file is optional and is your call. If instead the log shows "source":"env", CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN is set for the service and wins outright — it is never expiry-checked, so a stale value there produces the same symptom and only unsetting it fixes it.
The simplest path: ask your AI — paste Run ocp doctorand follow itsnext_action. Tell me if you hit anything that needs human input. The doctor emits a JSON next_action with ai_executable[] (commands to run verbatim) and human_required[] (usually just OAuth).
Most common issues:
-
EADDRINUSE: port 3456 already in use— an old OCP instance is bound. Find it (lsof -nP -iTCP:3456 -sTCP:LISTEN) and stop it (launchctl bootout gui/$(id -u)/dev.ocp.proxyon macOS,systemctl --user stop ocp-proxyon Linux). There is noocp stop— the proxy is a service;ocp restartbounces it. -
node: command not found/ version error — OCP needs Node.js 22.13+ (node --version). The floor is 22.13 and not 22.5 becausekeys.mjsimportsnode:sqliteat module load andserver.mjsimportskeys.mjsat module load, so a Node that needs--experimental-sqlitecannot start OCP at all — and nothing on the launch path passes that flag. Node removed the flag requirement in v22.13.0 and v23.4.0 (see nodejs.org/api/sqlite.html § History) — so 23.0–23.3 are also excluded, which is why the declared range is>=22.13.0 <23.0.0 || >=23.4.0and not a single floor. -
claude: command not found— install the Claude CLI, runclaude auth login, then re-runnode setup.mjs. -
**OCP refuses to start with
FATAL: this build of \claude` does not support --** — your Claude CLI is missing a flag OCP passes on every request, so every request would 500. Runclaude update(or reinstall the CLI) and start OCP again. This is the **boot-time capability probe** ([#455](https://github.com/dtzp555-max/ocp/issues/455)): OCP builds its real spawn argv, points--system-prompt-fileat a path that does not exist, and reads which of the two errors comes back —System prompt file not found(every flag known) orunknown option '--x'(one is not). It costs no quota, because the CLI stops at argument validation without starting a model turn. **Only an observedunknown optionrefuses the boot**; a missing binary, a slow host, or an unfamiliar message logsclaude_capability_probe_inconclusiveand starts normally, so the gate can never brick a fleet on an ambiguous reading. SetOCP_SKIP_CAPABILITY_PROBE=1` to disable it. -
Every request returns 500 with
error: unknown option '--system-prompt-file'— the same cause, on an instance where the probe is disabled or inconclusive. OCP passes the system prompt as a file rather than on the command line (see Security); the flag is measured working onclaude2.1.233+ and is absent fromclaude --help's option list, so you cannot confirm it there. Runclaude updateand restart OCP. -
Stray
ocp-sysprompt-*.txtfiles in your temp directory — OCP writes the system prompt to a0600temp file per request (it is passed as--system-prompt-file, not in argv — see Security) and removes it when the turn ends. A hard kill of the proxy (SIGKILL, a crash, a power loss) skips that cleanup, so one file per in-flight request can survive. They are owner-only and harmless; delete them if you like. Normal restarts, timeouts, spawn failures and client disconnects all clean up. -
Usage shows "unknown" / 401 — usually an expired Claude CLI session:
claude auth login && ocp restart. For the permanent TUI-modePlease run /login · API Error: 401that re-login can't fix, see docs/troubleshooting.md § permanent TUI-mode 401. -
ocp updaterefuses to restart (could not determine what ... owns the OCP port,not managed by any systemd unit,nothing is currently listening, a sudo message, or a rollback-scope message) — deliberate: the restart phase resolves which unit actually owns the port and refuses rather than guesses when it can't tell, or when guessing would be unsafe. See docs/troubleshooting.md § restart refusal for what each message means and how to proceed. -
The dashboard's "add key" / "revoke key" silently does nothing, or returns 403
forbidden_origin— you are reaching OCP at a public DNS name (ocp.example.com), or through a reverse proxy that rewritesHost. Declare the name you serve it on:OCP_ALLOWED_HOSTS=ocp.example.comWrite the bare host when the scheme's own default port is in use —
Originomits it, soocp.example.com:443will not match anhttps://ocp.example.comdashboard (OCP flags this at boot). It is correct if you serve plain HTTP on 443, which is why OCP warns rather than rejects: a declaration carries no scheme, so OCP cannot tell the two apart. Usehost:portfor any non-default port.Loopback, LAN addresses,
[::1], Tailscale addresses,localhostand*.localnames need no declaration — none of them can be pointed at your loopback by public DNS, which is the thing this setting exists to stop (ADR 0020). Behind nginx you likely also wantproxy_set_header Host $host;; Caddy preservesHostalready. -
A browser extension gets 403
forbidden_origin("cross-origin request rejected") — itsOriginismoz-extension://<id>(Firefox) orchrome-extension://<id>(Chromium), which the gate refuses by default. The rejected origin is in the proxy log asorigin_rejected. Admit that one extension withOCP_ALLOWED_HOSTS=<id>, or every extension of the browser withOCP_ALLOWED_ORIGIN_SCHEMES=moz-extension(orchrome-extension) — the second also lets every other installed extension drive the proxy (ADR 0023).
Bootstrap quirks (one-time migrations):
- Every request started returning 500
error: unknown option '--system-prompt-file'after upgrading to v3.32.0 — v3.32.0 stopped putting the system prompt on the command line, because argv is world-readable on Linux (/proc/<pid>/cmdline), and passes it as a0600file instead (#453). Your Claude CLI predates the--system-prompt-fileflag. Runclaude update(or reinstall the CLI) and restart OCP. Measured working onclaude2.1.233+; the flag is absent fromclaude --help's option list, so you cannot confirm it there, and since #455 OCP refuses to start rather than failing per request when it detects this: the boot log carriesFATAL: this build ofclaudedoes not support --system-prompt-file. If you are seeing per-request 500s instead, the boot probe was skipped (OCP_SKIP_CAPABILITY_PROBE=1) or returnedclaude_capability_probe_inconclusive. - Dashboard mutations started returning 403 after upgrading to v3.31.0 — v3.31.0 stopped letting an undeclared public DNS name vouch for itself, because that shape is indistinguishable from DNS rebinding (ADR 0020, #446). If your dashboard lives at a real domain, set
OCP_ALLOWED_HOSTSto it once and restart. Nothing reached by IP,localhost,*.localor Tailscale is affected. - A TUI session vanished right after upgrading OCP — if a pre-3.21.1 and a post-3.21.1 instance ran on the same host at the same time during an upgrade, the new instance's one-time boot reap can, once, kill an old-format (
ocp-tui-<8hex>) live TUI session belonging to the still-running old instance. Restart the affected session (ocp restartor re-run your TUI turn) and it returns under the new instance's port-scoped naming. - OpenClaw shows old models after
ocp update(v3.10→v3.11 only) — the running shell had the oldcmd_updatecached, so the sync hook doesn't fire on that single jump. Run once:node ~/ocp/scripts/sync-openclaw.mjs && openclaw gateway restart. Every future update syncs automatically. - Response-cache hit rate drops once after upgrading to v3.25.0 — only if you run with the cache on (
CLAUDE_CACHE_TTL > 0; it is off by default). v3.25.0 keys the cache on the resolved model instead of the string the client sent, so alias-addressed rows (and all structured-output rows) orphan and are reaped by the TTL cleanup within one window. No action required. Details: docs/troubleshooting.md#cache-rekey-v3250. ocp update's fresh-install path (pre-v3.4.0 hosts) is execution-unverified and now requires an explicit--fresh-installflag, dated 2026-08-01 (issue #227) — this path (rm -rf ~/ocp, a freshgit clone,node setup.mjs) was dead onmainuntil #217 reconnected it as a side effect of an unrelated fix; its kind-detection logic and its--yesgate are unit-tested, but the real commands it runs have never executed, in CI or by hand.ocp update --yesalone no longer runs it — see docs/upgrading.md § Old version (< v3.4.0) for exactly what is and isn't verified, and runocp update --fresh-install --yesonly once you've read that.start.shkeeps its pre-issue-#246 bare-lsofport check on a host that only ever takes patch bumps —start.sh(the manual launcher; the auto-start service unit/plist never calls it) is regenerated only bysetup.mjs, which only the full (cross-minor) upgrade path and a fresh install run —ocp update's light/patch-bump path (_cmd_update_light) never callssetup.mjsand so never rewritesstart.sh. A host that stays on patch bumps for a while therefore keeps whateverstart.shit last got from a full upgrade or install, even afterocp updates that already fixed the underlyingscripts/lib/start-sh.mjsgenerator. Force a regeneration withnode setup.mjs --reconfigure-only(writesstart.shwithout enabling/starting the service), or just wait for the next cross-minor upgrade.
Full manual — setup failures, env-var-not-taking-effect-after-restart (launchd bootout+bootstrap vs kickstart -k), stuck sessions, "OpenClaw registry out of sync", and the two-layer TUI-mode 401 root cause + fix: docs/troubleshooting.md.
Top-level files a contributor or operator may need to know:
| Path | Role |
|---|---|
server.mjs |
The proxy itself; every request path lives here. Governed by ALIGNMENT.md. |
setup.mjs |
First-time installer — verifies Claude CLI, patches OpenClaw config, installs auto-start. |
uninstall.mjs |
Reverses the launchd / systemd auto-start install. |
keys.mjs |
API-key management module (multi-mode auth: create/list/revoke, quotas, usage tracking). |
models.json |
Single source of truth for model IDs, aliases, context windows. See ADR 0003. |
ocp / ocp-connect |
User-facing CLI wrappers (server-side / client-side respectively). |
dashboard.html |
Static dashboard served from /dashboard. |
lib/constants.mjs |
Shared constants (default port, loopback host, local proxy URL) — one definition for server.mjs, setup.mjs, the scripts/ helpers and lib/tui/. The bash CLIs cannot import it and carry a keep-in-sync note instead. |
lib/env.mjs |
Fail-closed positive-integer parsing for the numeric env caps (body size, image bytes, …). |
lib/multimodal.mjs |
OpenAI image_url content parts → Anthropic image blocks for claude -p --input-format stream-json. See § "Images / Multimodal (Vision)". |
lib/net.mjs |
isLoopbackBind() — true only for addresses that cannot be reached from another host; anything else (0.0.0.0, ::, a concrete LAN/Tailscale IP) counts as network-exposed. Gates TUI mode (OCP_TUI_ALLOW_LAN) and the OCP_LOCAL_TOOLS boot check, both of which fail closed on a non-loopback bind. |
lib/prompt.mjs |
Pure system-prompt assembly: operator append, per-model truncation budget, wrapper selection. See ADR 0011. |
lib/spawn-auth.mjs |
Pure primitives for -p spawn-token resolution and HOME isolation (serial mutex, TTL cache, expiry, label ordering). |
lib/structured-output.mjs |
OpenAI response_format helpers — detection, JSON-Schema validation, payload extraction. Class B.1, ADR 0006. |
lib/tool-support.mjs |
classifyToolRequest() — which tools / tool_choice / function_call shapes OCP must refuse. See ADR 0013. |
lib/tui/ |
Subscription-pool (TUI) mode internals: warm-pane pool, semaphore, session, stream, transcript. |
scripts/sync-openclaw.mjs |
Idempotent OpenClaw registry sync invoked by ocp update. See ADR 0004. |
scripts/b2-key-snapshot.mjs |
Records every grandfathered Class B.2 endpoint's response key set from the wire (boots a real server.mjs against a fixture, probes each endpoint+method pair in ALIGNMENT.md's inventory, records key paths but never values). Two configuration profiles since #357 — probes (the default fleet config) and probesTuiPool (CLAUDE_TUI_MODE=true, OCP_TUI_POOL_SIZE=1, CLAUDE_SKIP_PERMISSIONS=true), which is what guards /health's tui.pool counter bag; both get all 14 pairs and their own coverage check. No real claude pane is ever booted: OCP_TUI_TMUX_BIN points at a stub tmux, and the suite asserts from its log that the only invocation is list-sessions. npm test fails on any difference from the checked-in snapshot. Run standalone with node scripts/b2-key-snapshot.mjs, or --write to regenerate after a deliberate, authorized addition (every command covers every profile). |
docs/governance/b2-response-keys.json |
The checked-in snapshot, one block per profile. Its git history is the per-release record of how B.2 surface actually grew — git log -p docs/governance/b2-response-keys.json. Its notCovered block states what the mechanism cannot see; read it before treating a green run as coverage. |
scripts/lib/service-mode.mjs |
Pure decision layer for setup.mjs's auto-start step — first install vs. --reconfigure-only (issue #226). |
scripts/lib/install-autostart.mjs |
Injectable installAutoStart() — setup.mjs's auto-start install (legacy-unit migration, unit write, enable/start/bootstrap), extracted so tests can observe real run/fs calls instead of asserting on source text (issue #226). |
scripts/lib/restart-unit.mjs |
Resolves which systemd unit (Linux) or launchd job (macOS) actually owns the OCP port before the upgrade/rollback restart phase touches anything — refuses rather than guesses when it can't tell. The two platforms verify different things (issue #239): Linux discovers whichever unit actually holds the port via a /proc/<pid>/cgroup walk and compares that discovery against the expected unit; macOS only checks whether its one hard-coded expected job (dev.ocp.proxy, gui-domain only) is the port's holder, and cannot identify an unexpected job if that check fails — a root-owned dev.ocp.proxy LaunchDaemon hits a permanent refusal there today (issue #290). The working-tree comparison that distinguishes a second local OCP checkout from the production install (issue #254) is Linux-only (/proc/<pid>/cwd has no macOS equivalent), and the darwin branch is exercised nowhere in this repo's CI (Linux-only runners) — verified only live, read-only, against a real host. See docs/upgrading.md § Restart target resolution. |
scripts/lib/start-sh.mjs |
Builds the standalone start.sh launcher setup.mjs writes (issue #246) — extracted so this logic can be driven by injected fake binaries in tests, since setup.mjs itself must never be executed by the test suite. Two distinct port checks live here, each with its own Linux/macOS split, and they are not symmetric with each other: start.sh's own nohup-gating check (darwinListeningCheck/nonDarwinListeningCheck) uses absolute-path lsof/netstat plus a netstat cross-check for lsof's privilege-gap ambiguity on macOS (a restricted PATH, e.g. a launchd job's default environment, can omit /usr/sbin entirely), and a bare, non-absolute-path lsof on Linux, deliberately; the separate post-install bind check (buildBindCheckCommand) uses absolute-path lsof only — no netstat cross-check — on macOS, and a bare ss -tlnp on Linux. |
.claude/skills/ |
Project-specific Claude Code skills. |
ocp-plugin/ |
OpenClaw gateway plugin (optional installation). |
docs/lan-mode.md |
LAN & multi-user operations manual (server/client setup, keys, quotas, anonymous access, security model). |
docs/tui-mode.md |
Subscription-pool (TUI) mode: setup, latency, streaming, warm-pane pool, drift monitoring. |
docs/troubleshooting.md |
Full troubleshooting manual, including the permanent TUI-mode 401 root cause + fix. |
docs/upgrading.md |
Upgrade manual (ocp update paths, rollback, OpenClaw auto-sync). |
docs/adr/ |
Architecture Decision Records. Read these before proposing governance or SPOT changes — see docs/adr/README.md. |
ALIGNMENT.md |
The constitution. Binding for any server.mjs change. |
AGENTS.md / CLAUDE.md |
Agent and Claude-Code-specific session instructions. |
- Localhost by default — binds to
127.0.0.1; setCLAUDE_BIND=0.0.0.0to enable LAN access - 3-tier auth —
none(trusted network),shared(single key),multi(per-user keys with usage tracking) - Timing-safe key comparison — prevents timing attacks on API keys and admin keys
- Cross-origin requests refused — a request carrying an
Originheader outside the loopback/private-range allowlist is rejected403on any method exceptGET/HEAD, before auth and before routing. Browsers always sendOrigincross-origin, so this closes the ordinary path by which a web page you merely visit could drive the proxy — which, with the default tool set, means running commands as you. It does not close DNS rebinding, which produces a genuinely same-origin request that noOrigincheck can distinguish; see ADR 0019 § "What this does not do". Same-origin requests are admitted by comparingOrigintoHost, so reaching the dashboard by hostname,[::1], a Tailscale address or through a TLS proxy keeps working. It does not wall off a page served from an origin the allowlist admits — any other loopback port, or any host on your LAN. Clients that send noOrigin(curl, the OpenAI SDKs,ocp-connect) are unaffected and need no change. See ADR 0019 - The system prompt is not in argv — it is written to a
0600temp file and passed as--system-prompt-file, because argv is world-readable on Linux (/proc/<pid>/cmdlineis mode-r--r--r--, and a default/procmount carries nohidepid). Before this, any local account on the host could read every system prompt the proxy handled — the client'ssystemmessages plusCLAUDE_SYSTEM_PROMPT— for the lifetime of each request. The conversation already went over stdin and the OAuth token over the child's env (/proc/<pid>/environis-r--------), so this was the one sensitive channel still in the open. The file is removed when the turn ends; a hard kill of the proxy can leave one behind, which at0600is litter rather than a leak. - Admin-only key management — creating, listing, and revoking keys requires the admin key
- Public endpoints —
/healthand/dashboardare always accessible without auth - No API keys needed — authentication goes through Claude CLI's OAuth session
- Keys stored locally —
~/.ocp/ocp.db(SQLite), never sent to external services - Auto-start — launchd (macOS) / systemd (Linux)
OCP runs under a small set of binding documents so contributions stay aligned with what cli.js actually does, not what an LLM thinks it does:
ALIGNMENT.md— the constitution. Every Class A endpoint (thecli.js-mirror surface) must correspond to somethingcli.jsactually does, with a line-number citation. Class B endpoints — OCP's OpenAI-compatible and administrative surface, wherecli.jsis not the wire authority — cite OpenAI's specification or their authorizing ADR instead. Background in ADR 0002 and ADR 0006..github/workflows/alignment.yml— CI guardrail. Grepsserver.mjsfor known-hallucinated tokens and fails the build on any hit. Not suppressible without anALIGNMENT.mdamendment PR.AGENTS.md— guidelines any AI coding agent (Claude Code / Cursor / Copilot / Codex / Gemini) should read before touching this repo.docs/governance/b2-response-keys.json— a per-release record of every grandfathered Class B.2 endpoint's response key set, taken from the wire rather than from prose, and enforced bynpm test. Adding a field to/health,/status,/cache/statsor any other B.2 response fails the suite until the snapshot is updated and the addition is authorized under ADR 0012. Replaces the CHANGELOG grep that used to serve this role; see ADR 0012 andCLAUDE.md§governance_audits.models.json— single source of truth for the model registry. See ADR 0003.docs/adr/— architecture decision records explaining why current structure exists.
If you want to contribute: read ALIGNMENT.md first, then classify the change before writing anything — Class A (the cli.js-mirror surface) needs a cli.js:NNNN line citation; Class B.1 (/v1/chat/completions, /v1/models) needs the relevant OpenAI specification section plus ADR 0006; Class B.2 (/health, /dashboard, /logs, /status, /settings, /api/keys*, /api/usage, /cache*) needs the endpoint's authorizing ADR. See CLAUDE.md § "Classify the change first" for the full table.
OCP has been open source from day one — not a freemium tool, not a commercial product turned open, just open. It will stay that way forever. No paid tiers, no premium features, no "Pro" version locked behind a paywall.
I built it because my family and I needed it. We use OCP every day across our own machines and IDEs — keeping one Claude Pro/Max subscription powering everything, saving the per-token API cost we'd otherwise pay. It's been quietly heartwarming to hear from users online who say OCP has saved them money the same way it saves ours. That's the whole point.
Behind every version are hundreds of hours that don't show up in commits: building it from scratch, adding new features as the Claude Code ecosystem evolves, debugging across Mac / Windows / Linux machines, validating against half a dozen IDEs (Claude Code, Cursor, Cline, OpenCode, Aider, Continue.dev, OpenClaw), tracking down cli.js drift, OAuth refresh edge cases, SSE streaming quirks, concurrency leaks, and the occasional incident that turns into a multi-day investigation (the 2026-04-11 alignment drift, the v3.11.1 concurrency leak, the v3.12 SSE replay regression).
The commitment: this project will keep being updated, keep getting new features, and will stay open source as long as I'm able to maintain it.
Please try it. If something breaks or could be better, open an issue — feedback is genuinely what keeps the project moving.
And if OCP saves you (or your team, or your family) real money and you'd like to chip in toward the next debugging session:
Donations directly fund the time it takes to keep OCP saving the community money.
MIT — see LICENSE.
Footnotes
-
OpenClaw is an IDE-agnostic AI coding agent (sibling project to OCP). When OCP runs on the same machine, OpenClaw can use it as a local provider — see
scripts/sync-openclaw.mjsand ADR 0004. ↩