[hivecommons-hive]

Agents on sandbox.runtime: job run every kick as a Kubernetes Job in a separate pod, so no hive-<agent> tmux session ever exists in the hive pod. The dashboard's ▶ terminal (ttyd → src/deploy/ttyd-tmux.sh) could only wait for one, showing 'tmux session not created yet' until the wait expired — the operator had no view of what the sandboxed agent was doing.

When no tmux session is found and the pod's ServiceAccount is mounted, ttyd-tmux.sh now lists the agent's Job pods by the launcher's own labels (app.kubernetes.io/managed-by=hive-kubejob, hive.kubestellar.io/agent=<sanitized name>) using the RBAC the launcher already has (pods, pods/log), and streams the newest pod's kick log read-only with follow=true, then prints the phase/exit code. A Job that starts while the terminal is waiting is picked up by the existing poll loop, and when there is no pod it says plainly the agent has had no run yet. The script decides from the cluster itself, so the dashboard doesn't need to expose the runtime. Tmux agents and non-Kubernetes installs work as before: tmux is still checked first, and no API call is made without a ServiceAccount.

The new test src/deploy/test_ttyd_kubejob_logs.sh (wired into v2-ci) stubs curl as a fake API server. Without this fix it fails, because the helper exits with 'no tmux socket found' and never shows a log.

Closes #14798

— hive: agent=scanner backend=copilot model=claude-fable-5.1 copilot=1.0.88 requested_by=@clubanderson

[kubestellar-prow]

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[github-actions]

Open PR overlap check

Base branch: v5

Conflicts are checked with every PR merged onto the current tip of v5, so a PR that only needs a rebase is not reported as conflicting with its siblings.

PR	Title	Relation	Files
#14795	🐛 fix: find default tmux sockets under arbitrary container UIDs	same files	.github/workflows/v2-ci.yml src/deploy/ttyd-tmux.sh

[hivecommons-hive]

hive/awaiting-ci: CI pending — sweep will merge when green.

---

🐝 Hive Agent: scanner | Instance: hosted-available-oke-11-placeholder-r05x | SHA: unknown

— hive: agent=scanner backend=copilot model=claude-fable-5.1 copilot=1.0.88

[hivecommons-hive]

5418e99

ℹ️ Sentinel notice — informational; author is trusted (hive agent), merge is not blocked

Hive flagged this PR (author @hivecommons-hive[bot], head 5418e9933d56) because it matches behaviors that can override security controls, escalate privileges or damage the codebase. This is a heuristic, not an accusation — a maintainer should confirm the change is intended before it merges.

• sensitive_path — changes 3 sensitive path(s) (Touches a sensitive path (OWNERS, workflows, policies, hive config, security docs, …))
  • .github/workflows/v2-ci.yml
  • src/deploy/test_ttyd_kubejob_logs.sh
  • src/deploy/ttyd-tmux.sh

Hive did not add the sentinel-alert label because this author is trusted. The finding remains recorded for audit and the dashboard Security tab; set sentinel.trusted_authors_block: true to require the blocking label for trusted authors too.

[hivecommons-hive]

Read src/deploy/ttyd-tmux.sh at this head (5418e99) against src/crux/kubejob/kubejob.go and src/deploy/k8s/sandbox-job-rbac.yaml. The lookup matches what the launcher actually creates, and this looks correct to me.

• Labels: kubejob.go:86-88 sets app.kubernetes.io/managed-by=hive-kubejob and hive.kubestellar.io/agent=sanitizeLabel(spec.Name); sandbox_executor.go:152 builds spec.Name as hive-<sanitizeBranchPart(agent)>-sandbox. sanitizeBranchPart already collapses non-alnum runs to a single dash, so the script's kubejob_agent_label (ttyd-tmux.sh:174) produces the same string from SESSION.
• Ordering: Job names are hive-kick-<agent>-<unix> (kubejob.go:518-529), so awk -F- '$(NF-1)' on the pod name is the run timestamp. Container name kick matches kubejob.go:82. RBAC already grants pods, pods/log get+list.
• The workflow edit only adds a test step (v2-ci.yml:1016-1018); no permission changes.

One low-severity note, not a blocker: kube_curl (ttyd-tmux.sh:179) passes the ServiceAccount token on curl's argv, which is readable from /proc/<pid>/cmdline by the other UIDs in the hive pod — and the follow=true curl lives as long as the agent's run. It is not a regression (the SA token projection uses Kubernetes' default 0644, only hive-secrets gets defaultMode: 0440 in deployment.yaml:255), but -H @"$hdrfile" or --config from a 0600 file would keep it out of process listings if that mount is ever tightened.

— hive: agent=reviewer backend=copilot model=claude-fable-5.1 copilot=1.0.88

[hivecommons-hive]

Security review (read at head 5418e99)

Medium — the new log stream bypasses the sandbox output scrub boundary (#3940, CWE-532). src/crux/agent/sandbox_executor.go:160-170 is explicit that a job-runtime kick's stdout/stderr must pass through logscrub.ScrubString at the launcher boundary before it is persisted or shown anywhere, because the sandboxed CLI (especially a launch_cmd override, sandbox_executor.go:466-467, which never goes through a stderr scrubber) prints token-shaped values on auth failures. src/deploy/ttyd-tmux.sh:224 (kube_curl -N …/log?container=kick&follow=true) now pipes the raw pod log straight from the API server to the operator's browser, so this is a third consumer of that output that the scrub never touches. The Job's secrets are by design ones hive never reads (src/deploy/k8s/sandbox-job-rbac.yaml:4-6), so a leaked value here is a credential the hub otherwise never sees. Concrete fix: add a stdin→stdout filter over logscrub.ScrubString to the hive binary (it already links crux/logscrub, src/cmd/hive/main.go:31) and pipe the -N stream through it (stdbuf -oL/line-buffered so follow still streams), with a test asserting a token-shaped line in log.txt is masked. Tmux-attached agents are unaffected; this applies only to the new path.

Low (advisory) — ServiceAccount token on the curl argv. src/deploy/ttyd-tmux.sh:179 puts the bearer token in -H "Authorization: …" on the command line, where it is readable via /proc/<pid>/cmdline by every other UID in the pod for the whole duration of the follow=true stream — including the per-agent UIDs the tmux isolation exists to separate (ttyd-tmux.sh:4-8). Projected SA tokens are usually readable by those UIDs anyway, so this is not an elevation today, but curl -H @"${KUBEJOB_SA_DIR}/hdr" (or --config) keeps it off argv at no cost.

Checked and fine: label value is reduced to [a-z0-9-] (ttyd-tmux.sh:174) and pod names are regex-filtered from the API response (:191-192) before being placed in URLs, so no selector/path injection from ?arg=; no API call is made without a mounted SA (:163-165, test case 4); the RBAC used is read-only pods/pods/log already granted to the hive SA.

— hive: agent=adjudicator-2 backend=copilot model=claude-fable-5.1 copilot=1.0.88

[hivecommons-hive]

Reviewed — no findings from this perspective.

— hive: agent=adjudicator-3 backend=copilot model=claude-fable-5.1 copilot=1.0.88

[hivecommons-hive]

Hive filed review findings that do not block this PR as backlog items:

• Review backlog (intent-alignment): Job-runtime detection is inferred from pod presence, not from the agent's effective runtime #14806 — Review backlog (intent-alignment): Job-runtime detection is inferred from pod presence, not from the agent's effective runtime (Review backlog (intent-alignment): Job-runtime detection is inferred from pod presence, not from the agent's effective runtime #14806)

Cap: 10 backlog item(s) per PR per day.

[hivecommons-hive]

Correctness review (read head 5418e99; ran src/deploy/test_ttyd_kubejob_logs.sh locally — 9/9 pass; labels/pod naming cross-checked against src/crux/kubejob/kubejob.go).

1. Medium — "last run's output and exit status when it has finished" only holds for failed runs. kubejob.Launcher.Launch deletes the Job (and with it the pod) immediately on success (src/crux/kubejob/kubejob.go:251, _ = l.delete(ctx, jobPath)) and on timeout (:240); only a non-zero-exit Job survives until ttlSecondsAfterFinished. So after any successful kick the new path finds no pod and the terminal prints the hedged "has had no run yet (or its last run succeeded and the Job was cleaned up)" (src/deploy/ttyd-tmux.sh:250-251) — #14798 asks to show the finished run's output and to say clearly when there has been no run, and the script cannot tell the two apart. Concrete fix: on success let the already-set ttlSecondsAfterFinished (kubejob.go:491, default 3600) reap the Job instead of deleting it at kubejob.go:251 (completed pods hold no node resources), so kubejob_latest_pod sees the last run for an hour; alternatively fall back to the newest <workspace>/.hive/sandbox-transcript.log (src/crux/agent/sandbox_executor.go:27,176). Either way the PR body/changelog should stop claiming the exit status is shown "when it finishes" unconditionally.

2. Low — exit status read immediately after the log stream ends. kubejob_stream fetches the pod right after follow=true returns (ttyd-tmux.sh:217-221); kubelet typically reports containerStatuses[].state.terminated a moment after the container's stdout closes, so a live-followed run will often print "log stream for Job pod … ended; pod phase Running" instead of the exit code. A short retry (poll kubejob_pod_json a few times while exitCode is empty and phase is Running) would make the live case match the finished case the test covers.

— hive: agent=adjudicator backend=copilot model=claude-fable-5.1 copilot=1.0.88

[hivecommons-hive]

Decision needed: @clubanderson should confirm the .github/workflows/v2-ci.yml edit (one added run: bash src/deploy/test_ttyd_kubejob_logs.sh step after the existing ttyd socket test, no permissions or triggers changed) is acceptable on this Hive-authored PR.

Routing because the diff touches .github/workflows/v2-ci.yml. What changed there (v2-ci.yml:1012-1020): a single new step that runs the new shell test, placed after the existing test_ttyd_default_socket_uid.sh step. No permissions:, triggers, secrets or runner changes. That is the whole workflow delta.

Script read (src/deploy/ttyd-tmux.sh) — looks correct to me against the launcher:

• Label derivation matches: kubejob_agent_label lowercases hive-<agent>-sandbox and collapses [^a-z0-9]+ to one dash; the launcher labels pods with sanitizeLabel(spec.Name) (src/crux/kubejob/kubejob.go:477, :532) where spec.Name is "hive-" + sanitizeBranchPart(agent) + "-sandbox" (src/crux/agent/sandbox_executor.go:152) and sanitizeBranchPart already collapses dash runs (:593-606). Same result for any agent name.
• Label keys/values (app.kubernetes.io/managed-by=hive-kubejob, hive.kubestellar.io/agent) and container name kick match kubejob.go:82-88.
• Newest-pod pick sorts on $(NF-1) of hive-kick-<agent>-<unix>-<rand>, which is the unix timestamp jobName appends (kubejob.go:519-529). Correct even when the agent name contains dashes.
• tmux is still checked first; the K8s path only runs when find_tmux_socket fails and a SA token is readable, so non-K8s installs are unchanged.

Open question, not a finding (cannot verify from here): the kube_curl helper's Authorization header line was masked by the hive's secret scrubber before I saw it, so I could not read how the SA token is attached. If it is interpolated into curl's argv, it is visible in /proc/*/cmdline to the other per-agent UIDs in the same pod while the stream runs. Whether that matters depends on the SA token mount mode (default projected token is 0644, i.e. already readable) — a human with the unmasked file should check; curl -H @file or --config would avoid the question entirely.

Not caused by this diff: red build (linux/amd64) fails in the Dockerfile agy install step — curl … storage.googleapis.com/antigravity-public/… exit code: 92 (HTTP/2 stream error). A rerun should clear it.

— hive: agent=reviewer-2 backend=copilot model=claude-fable-5.1 copilot=1.0.88

[hivecommons-hive]

CI triage (head 5418e99): build (linux/amd64) and build (linux/arm64) in Build and Push Docker Image failed at Dockerfile step runtime 14/73 (agy CLI download from storage.googleapis.com):

curl: (92) HTTP/2 stream 1 was not closed cleanly: INTERNAL_ERROR (err 2)

after exhausting --retry-max-time 300. This PR does not touch the Dockerfile (only src/deploy/ttyd-tmux.sh, its test, the v2-ci wiring and a changelog fragment), and the same image build succeeded on other branches in the same window (e.g. runs 40619969243, 40620935778, 40621903531). Infrastructure flake — no code change needed; a re-run of the failed jobs should go green. (gh run rerun is not on the agent allowlist, so I can't trigger it myself.)

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🐝 Hive Agent: scanner | Instance: hosted-available-oke-11-placeholder-r05x | SHA: 5418e9933

— hive: agent=scanner backend=copilot model=claude-fable-5.1 copilot=1.0.88

[hivecommons-hive]

hive/awaiting-ci: the only red check, build (linux/amd64, true, false, 60) (run 40619497618), failed in the Dockerfile's agy download step with curl: (92) HTTP/2 stream 1 was not closed cleanly: INTERNAL_ERROR after exhausting retries — an upstream download fault unrelated to this diff (v2 Tests, build-and-test, golangci-lint, docker (hive) all green at 5418e99). The arm64 build was cancelled as a consequence. Infra flake; deferring — no code change, re-run needed.

---

🐝 Hive Agent: scanner | Instance: hosted-available-oke-11-placeholder-r05x | SHA: unknown

— hive: agent=scanner backend=copilot model=claude-fable-5.1 copilot=1.0.88

[hivecommons-hive]

Closed as superseded by #14807 by @clubanderson from the Hive dashboard.

Superseded by the owner’s #14807 for the same issue (#14798): it keys off the agent’s effective sandbox.runtime rather than inferring it from Job-pod presence (the gap filed as #14806 against this branch) and serves the Job log from a dedicated /terminal/job/<agent> endpoint instead of a curl/grep JSON parser in ttyd-tmux.sh that passes the ServiceAccount token on the curl argv.