Fix Core 0.7 input boundaries before acceptance (0.8.5)

README.md

@@ -169,4 +169,4 @@ Both paths use transactional state updates.
 See [DEPLOYMENT.md](DEPLOYMENT.md) for operational hardening and `compatibility.py` for
 explicit historical integrity verification.
 
-The current schema is synchronized from `hjs-spec/jep-core` revision `da3fca00be456497f2dbfa045a1bc84aa3ce966d`; its published -07 source remains frozen.
+The current structural schema is synchronized with `hjs-spec/jep-core/schemas/jep-event.schema.json`. Its SHA-256 is `d03b607fc7bbb3eb5fda587a21d44fa31a05dd79a8eb40c63ec099785a49801d`. The published -07 source remains frozen; this software patch only aligns existing input checks.

RELEASE-NOTES.md

@@ -1,3 +1,16 @@
+# Software 0.8.5
+
+Current Core 0.7 verification now rejects empty extension identifiers and digest
+strings with trailing line terminators. The current JWS path validates every
+protected-header JSON value for supported finite numbers and well-formed Unicode,
+while still verifying the original protected bytes (canonical header JSON is not
+required). Explicit historical decoding is unchanged.
+
+Regression tests use real signatures, both archival and acceptance routes, and a
+corrected retry with the same Event Identity. Invalid input must not consume
+acceptance state. Existing stored events and accepted identities are not rewritten
+or reset. The schema copy matches the current Core structural hardening patch.
+
 # Software 0.8.4
 
 Complete the JCS numeric roundtrip repair: accept the canonical shortest decimal spelling of a binary64 number as well as its exact integer value. For example, JavaScript emits `1000000000000000100` for the float whose exact integer value is `1000000000000000128`. Both serialize to the same JCS bytes. Noncanonical precision-losing integers and overflow remain rejected.

VERSION

@@ -1 +1 @@
-0.8.4
+0.8.5

jep-event-0.7.schema.json

@@ -56,6 +56,9 @@
       "type": "object",
       "additionalProperties": {
         "type": "object"
+      },
+      "propertyNames": {
+        "minLength": 1
       }
     },
     "ext_crit": {
@@ -82,7 +85,7 @@
   "$defs": {
     "digest": {
       "type": "string",
-      "pattern": "^(?:sha256:[0-9a-f]{64}|(?!sha256:)[a-z0-9][a-z0-9-]*:[0-9a-f]+)$"
+      "pattern": "^(?:sha256:[0-9a-f]{64}|(?!sha256:)[a-z0-9][a-z0-9-]*:[0-9a-f]+)(?![\\s\\S])"
     },
     "eventIdentity": {
       "type": "object",

main.py

@@ -162,7 +162,7 @@ def detached_jws_sign(unsigned_event: Dict[str, Any]) -> str:
     return f"{protected_b64}..{b64u(signature)}"
 
 
-def detached_jws_verify(event: Dict[str, Any]) -> tuple[bool, Optional[Dict[str, Any]]]:
+def detached_jws_verify(event: Dict[str, Any], *, strict_current: bool = False) -> tuple[bool, Optional[Dict[str, Any]]]:
     sig = event.get("sig")
     if not isinstance(sig, str) or sig.count(".") != 2:
         return False, error("ERR_SIGNATURE_CONTAINER_INVALID", "sig is not detached JWS Compact Serialization", 1)
@@ -173,6 +173,10 @@ def detached_jws_verify(event: Dict[str, Any]) -> tuple[bool, Optional[Dict[str,
 
     try:
         protected = json.loads(b64u_decode(protected_b64).decode("utf-8"), object_pairs_hook=strict_object, parse_constant=reject_constant)
+        if strict_current:
+            # Validate all decoded values, but verify the original header bytes.
+            # Keep explicitly selected historical parsing behavior unchanged.
+            jcs_seed(protected)
     except Exception as exc:
         return False, error("ERR_SIGNATURE_CONTAINER_INVALID", f"Invalid protected header: {exc}", 1)
 
@@ -485,7 +489,7 @@ def fail(code: str, message: str, check: str, *, indeterminate: bool = False):
         return fail("ERR_INVALID_TIMESTAMP", "when must be an integer Unix timestamp", "syntax")
     checks["syntax"] = "pass"
 
-    ok, sig_error = detached_jws_verify(event)
+    ok, sig_error = detached_jws_verify(event, strict_current=True)
     if not ok:
         return fail(
             sig_error["code"], sig_error["message"], "cryptographic",

tests/test_input_boundaries_07.py

@@ -0,0 +1,95 @@
+"""Signed hostile inputs must fail before changing current acceptance state."""
+import json
+import uuid
+
+import pytest
+from fastapi.testclient import TestClient
+
+import main
+
+client = TestClient(main.app)
+
+
+def new_event():
+    response = client.post('/v0.7/events/create', json={
+        'verb': 'J', 'who': 'did:example:boundary-api', 'id': str(uuid.uuid4()),
+        'what': {'claim': 'synthetic test'},
+    })
+    assert response.status_code == 200
+    return response.json()['event']
+
+
+def sign(event, header=None):
+    kid, signing = main.KEYS.snapshot()
+    if header is None:
+        header = json.dumps({'alg': 'Ed25519', 'kid': kid}).encode('utf-8')
+    protected = main.b64u(header)
+    unsigned = {k: v for k, v in event.items() if k != 'sig'}
+    data = (protected + '.' + main.b64u(main.jcs_seed(unsigned))).encode('ascii')
+    return {**unsigned, 'sig': protected + '..' + main.b64u(signing(data))}
+
+
+def assert_rejected_without_consuming(bad, original, check):
+    for mode in ('archival', 'acceptance'):
+        response = client.post('/v0.7/events/verify', json={'event': bad, 'mode': mode})
+        assert response.status_code == 200
+        result = response.json()
+        assert result['status'] == 'invalid', result
+        assert result['checks'][check] == 'fail'
+        if mode == 'acceptance':
+            assert result['acceptance'] == {'outcome': 'rejected', 'effect_applied': False}
+    first = main.validate_event_07(original, mode='acceptance')
+    retry = main.validate_event_07(original, mode='acceptance')
+    assert first['acceptance'] == {'outcome': 'accepted', 'effect_applied': True}
+    assert retry['acceptance'] == {'outcome': 'already_accepted', 'effect_applied': False}
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize('patch', [
+    {'ext': {'': {}}},
+    {'what': 'sha256:' + 'a' * 64 + '\n'},
+    {'ref': 'sha256:' + 'a' * 64 + '\n'},
+    {'ref': {'type': 'evidence', 'value': 'demo', 'hash': 'other:ab\n'}},
+])
+def test_schema_rejection_precedes_acceptance(patch):
+    original = new_event()
+    assert_rejected_without_consuming(sign({**original, **patch}), original, 'syntax')
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize('suffix', [
+    b',"extra":"\\ud800"}', b',"extra":{"\\udfff":true}}',
+    b',"extra":1e400}', b',"extra":NaN}',
+    b',"extra":1,"extra":2}', b',"extra":{"x":1,"x":2}}',
+])
+def test_current_header_rejection_precedes_acceptance(suffix):
+    original = new_event()
+    kid, _ = main.KEYS.snapshot()
+    header = json.dumps({'alg': 'Ed25519', 'kid': kid}).encode('utf-8')
+    assert_rejected_without_consuming(sign(original, header[:-1] + suffix), original, 'cryptographic')
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize('encoding', ['utf-16', 'utf-16-le', 'utf-16-be', 'utf-32', 'utf-32-le', 'utf-32-be'])
+def test_non_utf8_header_rejected(encoding):
+    original = new_event()
+    kid, _ = main.KEYS.snapshot()
+    raw = json.dumps({'alg': 'Ed25519', 'kid': kid}).encode(encoding)
+    assert_rejected_without_consuming(sign(original, raw), original, 'cryptographic')
+
+
+def test_noncanonical_but_valid_utf8_header_keeps_original_signature():
+    original = new_event()
+    kid, _ = main.KEYS.snapshot()
+    raw = json.dumps({'extra': {'text': '合法', 'number': 1e20}, 'kid': kid, 'alg': 'Ed25519'},
+                     ensure_ascii=False, indent=2).encode('utf-8')
+    event = sign(original, raw)
+    result = main.validate_event_07(event)
+    assert result['status'] == 'valid'
+    assert result['event_hash'] == main.event_hash(event)
+
+
+def test_explicit_legacy_header_parsing_is_not_reinterpreted():
+    original = new_event()
+    kid, _ = main.KEYS.snapshot()
+    raw = json.dumps({'alg': 'Ed25519', 'kid': kid}).encode('utf-8')[:-1] + b',"extra":1e400}'
+    event = sign(original, raw)
+    assert main.detached_jws_verify(event)[0] is True
+    assert main.detached_jws_verify(event, strict_current=True)[0] is False