[pull] main from danny-avila:main - #574
Merged
Merged
Conversation
…4972) * fix(shutdown): disarm the force-exit timer when test state is reset `shutdown()` arms a 60s timer that calls `process.exit(1)` as a safety net for drains that never finish. It is cleared only when the drain runs to completion, so a drain that never settles — an HTTP server whose close callback never fires, a task that hangs — leaves it armed. `__resetShutdownStateForTests()` clears the task list, the shutting-down flag and the server reference, but not that timer. A suite that triggers a signal therefore leaves a live self-destruct behind: `unref` keeps it from holding the process open, but it still fires if anything else keeps the process alive to the timeout, and `process.exit(1)` then takes down whatever is running a minute later. Jest reports that as a bare `process.exit called with "1"` with no failing test, because the run dies before it can print a summary. Track the timer at module scope, clear it from the reset helper, and clear it from a `finally` so a throwing drain step cannot leak it either. The new test fails without the reset change: it starts a drain that never settles, resets state, advances 120s, and asserts the process was not exited. * Scope the force-exit timer to the shutdown that armed it Hoisting the timer to module scope introduced an aliasing hazard: a drain that settles late runs its `finally` against whatever `forceExitTimer` points at by then. If state was reset and a second shutdown armed its own timer in the meantime, the late `finally` cleared the second shutdown's safety net instead of its own. Keep a local handle per shutdown, always clear that, and null the module reference only while it still identifies the same timer. The added test fails without this: it starts a drain whose close callback is withheld, resets state, starts a second shutdown, then releases the first callback and asserts the second net still force-exits.
…14977) * fix(agents): require code interpreter for programmatic MCP tools * test(data-provider): fix tool options fixture type * fix(agents): address programmatic tool review feedback * fix(agents): avoid no-op update on version revert
* 🪪 fix: Preserve Stored Access Token Expiry Over ID Token Exp
extractOpenIDTokenInfo let the ID token exp claim overwrite the token set's stored expires_at. The ID token is minted at login and never refreshed, so once a session outlives the ID token TTL, isOpenIDTokenValid reports the access token as expired even when expires_at is hours in the future, and OpenID placeholder substitution silently stops: MCP headers configured with {{LIBRECHAT_OPENID_ACCESS_TOKEN}} ship the literal placeholder string as the bearer credential and the receiving server rejects every connection with an unparseable JWT until the user fully logs out and back in.
The ID token exp now only fills a missing expiresAt instead of overriding a stored one. Identity claim enrichment from the ID token is unchanged, and the exp fallback for token sets without expires_at is preserved.
* 🪪 fix: Validate ID Token Expiry Before ID Token Placeholder Substitution
The precedence fix made isOpenIDTokenValid track only the access token expiry, so an MCP header using {{LIBRECHAT_OPENID_ID_TOKEN}} could substitute an ID token that had already expired. The ID token exp is now preserved separately as idTokenExpiresAt and checked at the ID token substitution site, so an expired ID token substitutes empty rather than a stale credential while access token substitution is unaffected.
* 🪪 fix: Address OpenID Expiry Review Round
Fix expires_at at the source in the OpenID JWT strategy. The stored value described the
incoming bearer's exp even when access_token came from the session or a cookie, so it could
describe a different credential entirely. A new decodeJwtExpiry helper reads the exp of the
token actually stored, and payload.exp is kept only when the raw bearer is the resolved
access token. Opaque session or cookie tokens now store no expiry rather than a wrong one.
Apply a 30 second clock skew buffer in isOpenIDTokenValid and isIdTokenCurrent via a new
exported OPENID_EXPIRY_BUFFER_SECONDS, mirroring OPENID_REUSE_EXPIRY_BUFFER_SECONDS in
AuthController. Tokens that would expire in transit are treated as already expired.
Make isIdTokenCurrent fail closed when idTokenExpiresAt is absent. exp is REQUIRED in an ID
token, so a missing value means the token is malformed or the claims parse threw. The check
uses == null so an exp of 0 counts as present and therefore expired.
Read the ID token exp with a numeric type check so an exp of 0 records idTokenExpiresAt and
fails closed downstream while a non-numeric exp is ignored, and compare the stored expiry
with != null so a gap filled expiry of 0 reads as expired instead of as no expiry at all.
Raise an actionable re authentication error for the ID token placeholder instead of
substituting an empty string. An empty substitution produced a malformed Authorization
header and a 400 downstream rather than a clean signal that the user must re authenticate.
Raise the same re authentication error from processSingleValue when a user has an OpenID
identity, the stored token set is no longer valid, and the value still contains a credential
bearing OpenID placeholder, so the expired access token case that motivated this PR signals
re auth instead of silently shipping or stripping the placeholder. Only the access token, ID
token, and generic token names raise: identity metadata resolves from the user document and
an expiry hint never needed a token, so those keep their existing literal then strip
behaviour. Unknown placeholder names also stay literal and diagnosable, matching the
existing resolvable placeholder policy.
Add the comments the review asked for on the exp fallback heuristic, the EXPIRES_AT
placeholder semantics, why stale ID token claims stay usable for identity fields, and the
advisory nature of the freshness check.
* 🪪 fix: Honour Opaque Access Tokens And Type The OpenID Re-Auth Error
Drop the ID token exp fallback in extractOpenIDTokenInfo. Storing the access token expiry
honestly means an opaque access token now records no expiry, and the fallback then handed the
ID token exp authority over a credential it does not describe. A deployment issuing opaque
access tokens alongside a short lived ID token saw isOpenIDTokenValid go false and the
credential guard reject a perfectly good access token, which worked before this branch. An
unknown access token expiry is now treated as no expiry, and the ID token exp only ever gates
ID token substitution through idTokenExpiresAt.
Give the re-authentication signal a type. OpenIDReauthRequiredError is raised at both the ID
token placeholder and the credential placeholder guard, ErrorController maps it to a 401
carrying the actionable message, and the class exposes statusCode so the agent generation
path answers 401 instead of a bare 500 for the same condition.
Omit rather than blank a header whose credential placeholder is still unresolved on a final
resolution pass, since an empty bearer credential is malformed under RFC 6750 while an absent
header lets the upstream answer its own challenge. Identity placeholders keep stripping to an
empty string.
Move the resolvable placeholder docblock onto the pattern it describes, resolve an EXPIRES_AT
of 0 as the string 0 for consistency with the neighbouring null checks, and let
AuthController consume the exported OPENID_EXPIRY_BUFFER_SECONDS so the 30 second skew
allowance has a single definition.
* feat: surface stateful workspace downloads * fix: sort workspace change imports * fix: reuse workspace button primitives * fix: hide collapsed workspace actions
* feat: route live subagent controls across replicas * fix: initialize task routing in cluster workers * fix: harden cross-replica task routing * fix: expire routed task owners independently * fix: close cross-replica routing edge cases * fix: bound owner refresh and close routed cancellation gaps Refresh owned task registrations in bounded parallel batches so a full heartbeat pass stays well inside the 30-second directory lease instead of serializing one Redis EVAL per registration. Route conversation-deletion cancellation through a dedicated owner-side scope operation. The owner applies the deletion predicate to its complete local task set, so a scope holding more children than the model-facing list cap no longer leaves live executors running after their parent is removed. Key a consumed claim's retained response by its operation rather than by one caller's correlation id, so a later poll recovers a terminal result whose responses were all lost. Live claim statuses stay uncached so a poll always observes the task's current state. Type the model-facing `maxLength` bounds with a narrow local string schema; the SDK's JsonSchemaType does not declare the keyword, and the runtime checks continue to enforce the same limits. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01H1cCMDrTWaRNkmtKjpWELZ * fix: retain claimed results apart from control replays A consumed claim is the only routed response whose loss destroys data, so it no longer shares one bounded cache with control replays that unrelated command traffic can evict. Claims are retained under their own budget, and the requester acknowledges a result it received so the owner releases the copy immediately instead of holding it for the full replay window. Resolve the post-delete cancellation pass from durable leases. The deleted conversations cannot be read back, so re-reading each one only scaled the cascade while probing the owner directory once per removed id; one lease read now resolves every live child address instead. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01H1cCMDrTWaRNkmtKjpWELZ * fix: never consume a result the owner cannot replay Retention for consumed claims is bounded, so a burst of undelivered results could evict an earlier one and lose it for good. The owner now admits a claim only while it can retain a worst-case result, and refuses the routed claim otherwise instead of consuming it, leaving the result on the task for a later poll. Retained claims are never displaced; control replays keep evicting. Key a control replay by the command itself rather than by one caller's correlation id. The transport's own retry reuses a single envelope, but a caller that saw the owner as unavailable reissues the command under a new id, which steered, queued, or interrupted the child a second time. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01H1cCMDrTWaRNkmtKjpWELZ * fix: own a claimed result until it is acknowledged A consumed terminal result is task-owned state, not a cache entry. It now carries no expiry at all: the owner holds it until a caller acknowledges receipt, and only then is it released. Retention stays bounded by the existing admission gate, which refuses a claim the owner could not keep rather than consuming a result it might drop. Identify a control by the caller's invocation instead of by its content. The tool mints one id per invocation and routing carries it, so a routed retransmission of that invocation replays the owner's result while two deliberate identical commands arrive under distinct ids and both apply. Content-derived identity could not tell those apart and would have answered the second from a stale snapshot. Wait for the dpkg frontend lock in the best-effort Playwright font step. Its timeout kills npx while the apt-get it spawned keeps the lock, which then failed the fatal Redis install and ended the MCP replica jobs before any test ran (#14983). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01H1cCMDrTWaRNkmtKjpWELZ * fix: treat acknowledgement as part of delivering a result Publishing an acknowledgement once and ignoring the outcome meant a result could be reported as delivered while the owner never learned it could let go, and since that retention neither expires nor evicts, enough lost acknowledgements would fill it and refuse every later remote claim. An acknowledgement is now confirmed: publishing to zero subscribers is not success, it retries inside the ordinary request window, and a claim whose acknowledgement cannot be confirmed reports the retryable unavailable path instead of handing back a result the owner still holds. A later poll recovers that result and acknowledges it, and releasing is idempotent. Owner registration also outlives the task while a result is unacknowledged, so the retained result cannot become unreachable. Take the control invocation identity from the provider's tool-call id rather than minting one per execution, so replaying the same tool call stays idempotent while two distinct calls with identical payloads both apply. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01H1cCMDrTWaRNkmtKjpWELZ * style: sort the widened node:crypto import Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01H1cCMDrTWaRNkmtKjpWELZ * fix: own control invocations and cancellation plans at the task seam Applies one logical control exactly once for its owning task rather than in the transport, so a local caller and a routed caller of the same invocation agree, and reusing an invocation id for different content is refused instead of silently applied. Invocation identity now comes from the run, agent, and provider tool-call id hashed to a bounded 32 characters, so a repeated `call_0` never bleeds across tasks and no id can overrun the routed bound. Cancellation for conversation deletion is now resolved into a plan while those rows are still readable, then replayed against the owner directory after the cascade is deleted. Owner registration is awaited before any provider work, so a child that cannot be addressed never starts. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01H1cCMDrTWaRNkmtKjpWELZ * style: separate the control invocation map from the next member Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01H1cCMDrTWaRNkmtKjpWELZ * fix: close subagent deletion, claim, and control invocation gaps Bulk conversation deletion now runs behind a durable owner admission fence. Draining alone could not close the race: a child admitted on another replica after the drain read its leases would start provider work against a parent about to disappear. The fence is written before any lease is read and each child revalidates it after its own lease is written, so one of the two always observes the other. It expires on its own, so a process lost mid-deletion cannot leave an account unable to run subagents. A terminal child result is no longer kept alive in the owning replica's memory until someone acknowledges it. Collection is recorded durably on the child's own message against the polling invocation, so the poll whose response was lost recovers its own result while a different invocation is told the result was already collected. Owner-side retention returns to an ordinary bounded cache that expires, which is what abandoned polls needed: they can no longer occupy claim capacity until the process restarts. The deletion drain now cancels each task under one invocation held for the whole drain, stops re-sending once the owner answers, and retries only deliveries it could not confirm. A routed control replay also validates the command fingerprint, so one invocation id carrying different content reaches the owner to be refused instead of collecting the earlier command's success. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01H1cCMDrTWaRNkmtKjpWELZ * test: assert the drain's calls before restoring its spies Restoring a spy also clears its recorded calls, so the drain assertions ran against an emptied mock. Formats the durable claim method tests. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01H1cCMDrTWaRNkmtKjpWELZ * fix: close the follow-on gaps in the deletion fence and result claim The admission fence now carries an ownership token, so an overlapping deletion's fence is never lifted by the one that finishes first, and both fence writes invalidate the cached auth user document. It also covers the other bulk-delete path: `DELETE /` with no conversation filter removes every conversation, so it runs behind the same fence rather than a bare drain. The durable record now decides who holds a one-shot result. An owner replaying a retained response could hand the same terminal claim to a second invocation; that invocation is told the result was already collected, while the one that consumed it still recovers its own. A task with no durable record to arbitrate keeps whatever the owner answered. Drain cancellation treats `not_found` as unconfirmed: a missing registration while the durable lease is still live means the child may be running, so the command is retried under its invocation once the owner republishes itself. Control fingerprints are hashed, so retaining one per invocation costs a fixed few bytes instead of a bounded message. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01H1cCMDrTWaRNkmtKjpWELZ * fix: hold every deletion fence and keep live idempotency records An owner now holds one admission fence per concurrent bulk deletion instead of one at a time, so admission reopens only when the last deletion finishes regardless of completion order. Expired fences are pruned as new ones arrive and the set is bounded, so an abandoned fence cannot accumulate or lock an account out. A failed durable claim write is no longer read as an absent record. Handing a terminal result over without recording its claimant would let another invocation collect the same one-shot output once the database recovered, so the collection reports the retryable unavailable path and leaves the result for a later poll. Control invocation records now evict tasks the store no longer holds before live ones, over a bounded scan. Dropping a live task's record would let a caller retry apply its queue, steer, or interrupt a second time once the transport replay had also expired. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01H1cCMDrTWaRNkmtKjpWELZ * fix: keep the deletion fence portable and never drop a live record The admission fence is written with plain update operators again. DocumentDB rejects pipeline-form updates, and this runs before any deletion, so the pipeline form would have failed both bulk-delete endpoints outright on a supported database target. An excess deletion is now refused rather than silently displacing the oldest active fence, which would have reopened admission for a deletion still running. Expired fences are pruned before the cap is tested, so only genuinely concurrent deletions count against it. Control invocation records now sweep every settled task's entry when the window fills, and a window of entirely live records refuses the new control before touching the child instead of evicting one. Applying a command with no room to record it would let the caller's own retry apply it twice. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01H1cCMDrTWaRNkmtKjpWELZ * fix: hold the fence, bound recovered results, and expire stale commands The admission fence is renewed for as long as its deletion runs, so a very large account or a stalled database cannot let it lapse while conversations are still being removed. Only the deletion's own fence is renewed, and the renewal stops with the operation. Cancellation now covers every conversation the cascade removed, not only the ones a plan named: a grandchild lives in its own parent's scope, which a plan naming the deleted root never reaches. A routed request carries the deadline its caller waits for, and an owner drops one that arrives past it. A publisher disconnected mid-request queues the envelope offline and delivers it after the caller was told the owner was unavailable, which would otherwise steer a child the caller believes untouched. A result recovered from its durable child message is bounded like a routed one. The message keeps the child's untruncated output, so recovery could otherwise return far more than the routed result limit allows. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01H1cCMDrTWaRNkmtKjpWELZ * test: size the fence window so a renewal can be observed The renewal test set a 30ms drain timeout but the five-minute grace window dominates it, so the interval was 100 seconds and no renewal could fire inside the test's deletion. The grace window is an option now, matching the store's other timings, and the test sizes the window to 90ms. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01H1cCMDrTWaRNkmtKjpWELZ * fix: wire the durable claim method and close the fence follow-ons The production store never received `claimSubagentTaskResult`, so every terminal result would have surfaced as unavailable once a task settled. The host wires that object from JavaScript, where the factory's parameter type checks nothing, so the factory now refuses a store missing any method it calls rather than failing at the first claim. The routing transport takes a dedicated publisher with the offline queue disabled. The shared client held commands issued during a disconnect and delivered them after the caller had given up, which the request deadline narrowed but could not close inside the clock-skew allowance. Fence renewal invalidates the cached auth document like the fence and release paths, and a renewal reporting its entry gone re-takes the fence instead of letting the deletion run on unfenced. The post-delete cancellation retries a transiently unreachable owner: the conversations are already gone, so it is the only pass that can still stop a late-admitted child. A replaced replay entry no longer leaves its bytes counted, which would have inflated the cache's total until unrelated responses were evicted. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01H1cCMDrTWaRNkmtKjpWELZ * test: wait on observed lease renewal instead of a fixed delay The shared-lease renewal test held a 60ms lease and slept 100ms before asserting an overlapping worker was refused, so a loaded runner that starved the 10ms heartbeat past the TTL let the lease lapse and the second worker run. Spy on acquisition and renewal, then wait until a renewal succeeds past the acquired lease's own deadline — direct evidence the heartbeat carried it past expiry, with no timing assumption — and give the lease enough headroom that a stalled timer no longer decides the outcome. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01H1cCMDrTWaRNkmtKjpWELZ * fix(agents): close the routing, fence, and cache gaps found in review Five separate seams, each with its own failure: `Cluster.duplicate` reads its first argument as a startup-node list and its second as the overrides, unlike `Redis.duplicate`, so the publisher's `enableOfflineQueue: false` was silently dropped under `USE_REDIS_CLUSTER` and a command issued mid-disconnect could still reach a child after its caller was told `unavailable`. Route both through `duplicateIoRedisClient`. The control window's capacity refusal ran before the store knew whether it owned the task, so unrelated local load could veto a cancellation bound for another replica. Establish that the task is local first and leave a remote one to its owner's window. `clearInterval` stops only future fence renewals. One already waiting on the database could resolve after the release, read its own lifted fence as expiry, and write a replacement that nothing remained to lift — closing subagent admission for the account until it aged out. Track the in-flight renewal, refuse overlapping passes, and await it before releasing. Every owner bounds its own task list, but the aggregation appended each batch whole, so the model-facing list grew with the number of replicas holding the scope. Cap the merged list while still reading every reply for the stale-registration sweep. The admission-fence prune commits independently of the fence that follows it, so a refused or failed push left the cached auth document describing entries the collection no longer held. Invalidate whichever way the second write goes. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01H1cCMDrTWaRNkmtKjpWELZ * fix(agents): cap the merged task list the poll tool actually reads Each owner bounds its own reply and the remote aggregation bounds their sum, but `listTasks` merged that bounded remote list with however many children this replica owns and returned it whole. `check_background_task` could therefore still receive roughly twice the advertised cap. Bound the deduplicated, sorted result and export the cap so both seams share one number. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01H1cCMDrTWaRNkmtKjpWELZ * test: admit every task the merged-list cap test starts The base store admits ten concurrent runs per scope by default, so starting 150 at once left most refused for capacity and the assertion never reached the merge it was written to check. Raise the cap for this store only; admission is a different invariant with its own tests. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01H1cCMDrTWaRNkmtKjpWELZ * fix(agents): let a deletion notice its admission fence lapsing Renewal failures were logged and swallowed, so a run of rejected writes let the last confirmed `fencedUntil` pass while the deletion carried on believing admission was still closed — long enough for another replica to admit a child against conversations about to be removed. Track the deadline only a confirmed write advances, and check it after the drain, before anything is deleted: nothing has been removed at that point, so the operation fails closed and the caller retries once the fence can be held. A lapse detected after the rows are gone is logged instead, since reporting failure there would invite a retry against conversations that no longer exist. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01H1cCMDrTWaRNkmtKjpWELZ * test: raise both concurrency caps the merged-list test trips Raising the per-scope limit left the store-wide `maxRunningTotal` at its default hundred, so fifty of the hundred and fifty starts were still refused. Verified against the base store directly this time: with only the per-scope cap raised it admits a hundred, and with both raised it admits all hundred and fifty. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01H1cCMDrTWaRNkmtKjpWELZ * fix(agents): close the fence renewal gap and keep running tasks listed A renewal that started before its deadline but landed after it was still credited with extending the fence from its own start time, so a window in which admission stood open was papered over: a child could take a lease the drain had already read past and the deletion would proceed without cancelling it. The deadline now only advances when the write lands while the previous one still holds; anything later records a lapse the fence cannot be restored backwards over. The model-facing cap sorted oldest-first and sliced, which dropped the newest tasks — including children that had only just started running, and which the poll tool offers no other way to discover. Bound by status instead: running children first, then the most recent settled results. Both caps share one helper, and the routed aggregation now bounds after its loop so the choice is made across every owner's reply rather than by whichever answered first. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01H1cCMDrTWaRNkmtKjpWELZ * fix(agents): finish the cap and the fence at the seams they still missed The status-aware cap only reached the requester: an owner's own reply still sliced positionally, so a replica holding more than the cap dropped its running children before the requester could bound anything. Both sides now share `boundedTaskList`. A fence that lapsed during the deletion itself was only logged. The rows are gone by then, so failing is still wrong, but the child another replica admitted while the fence was down is not: the fence is retaken and the drain repeated to cancel it. A child's lease renewal had the same retroactive hole the admission fence had — Mongo filters on the `now` captured before the call, so a write landing after the lease expired still moves the row forward, while an owner drain reading active leases in that gap saw the thread as free. The lease now carries its own deadline and a late renewal stops the executor. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01H1cCMDrTWaRNkmtKjpWELZ * test: cover the lease lapse and the post-deletion re-drain The owner-side cap shipped with a regression test; these two did not. One drives a lease renewal that succeeds only after the lease it was extending had expired and asserts the executor stops; the other lets the fence lapse during the deletion itself and asserts a second drain runs while the request still reports success. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01H1cCMDrTWaRNkmtKjpWELZ * fix(agents): close live-task lifecycle gaps * test(redis): exercise cluster node discovery * fix(test): type cluster discovery seam * fix(ci): wait for orphaned apt processes * fix(ci): reserve time for apt drain * fix(ci): skip optional fonts in MCP jobs * fix(agents): recover tasks after owner loss * fix(agents): preserve local task discovery * fix(agents): initialize fail-fast cluster publisher * style(agents): sort routing test imports --------- Co-authored-by: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat: wake parent agents on child completion * wip: harden child completion wakeup lifecycle * fix: close the completion-wakeup static failures Type the durable-claim store fixture, the continue-envelope test helper, and the terminal message's task metadata so the wakeup suites compile against the shapes they actually exercise. Replace `Array.prototype.at`, which the package target library does not provide. Capture the prepared child thread in a non-optional local before the provider callback closes over it, and narrow the trigger envelope itself on `mode === 'continue'` rather than a separately copied mode, so reading the continue target is sound. Lift the parent-message fallback out of a nested ternary into a named resolver. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01H1cCMDrTWaRNkmtKjpWELZ * test: cover the active-predecessor admission fence The Redis job-creation call gained a thirteenth scalar argument, so the spec helper reconstructed the HSET pairs one slot early and rebuilt an invalid job hash; three creation tests failed on that alone. Give the fence itself direct coverage in both store adapters, which it had none of despite deciding whether an automatic continuation may replace a live parent turn. Each proves a running and a requires_action predecessor are refused with the state a controller needs for a finite 409, that an absent or settled predecessor is admitted, and that an ordinary user turn without the policy still replaces its predecessor. The Redis case also asserts a refused continuation leaves the parent's durable job and chunks untouched. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01H1cCMDrTWaRNkmtKjpWELZ * fix: harden completion wakeup rollout and claims * fix: close completion wakeup race windows * test: keep the child store fixture exact * fix: close final subagent wakeup gaps * fix: preserve ambiguous completion claims * fix: release pre-admission wakeup claims * fix: stabilize subagent completion recovery --------- Co-authored-by: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
This file contains hidden or bidirectional Unicode text that may be interpreted or compiled differently than what appears below. To review, open the file in an editor that reveals hidden Unicode characters.
Learn more about bidirectional Unicode characters
Sign up for free
to subscribe to this conversation on GitHub.
Already have an account?
Sign in.
3 participants
Add this suggestion to a batch that can be applied as a single commit.This suggestion is invalid because no changes were made to the code.Suggestions cannot be applied while the pull request is closed.Suggestions cannot be applied while viewing a subset of changes.Only one suggestion per line can be applied in a batch.Add this suggestion to a batch that can be applied as a single commit.Applying suggestions on deleted lines is not supported.You must change the existing code in this line in order to create a valid suggestion.Outdated suggestions cannot be applied.This suggestion has been applied or marked resolved.Suggestions cannot be applied from pending reviews.Suggestions cannot be applied on multi-line comments.Suggestions cannot be applied while the pull request is queued to merge.Suggestion cannot be applied right now. Please check back later.
See Commits and Changes for more details.
Created by
pull[bot] (v2.0.0-alpha.4)
Can you help keep this open source service alive? 💖 Please sponsor : )