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`nbox serve --http --netbox-token-passthrough` (or `[serve].netbox_token_passthrough = true`) lets one process serve many users: each caller presents their own NetBox API token per request and nbox forwards it verbatim, so NetBox's object permissions and changelog apply to the real caller — no IdP and no `[serve.vault]` mapping. The token is read from `X-NetBox-Token`, or from `Authorization` when that header isn't already used by OIDC or `--http-token` (so a host that can only set a bearer works, without ever mistaking a JWT for a NetBox token). Each request builds its own client from the caller's credential. Isolation is a correctness requirement here, not an optimization, since NetBox returns different results to different users: - the read cache is partitioned per token fingerprint; - `nbox_cache_clear` drops only the caller's own partition; - `--allow-writes` runs writes under the caller's token. Fail closed: a request without a caller token is rejected with 401 and never downgraded to the server's profile token. Tokens are redacted in Debug, logs, and errors; the audit log carries `auth=netbox-token` plus a short SHA-256 fingerprint, which also keys the per-caller rate limit. Pass-through requires the HTTP transport — stdio has no per-request headers, so asking for it there is a usage error rather than a silent no-op — and it allows a routable bind, with TLS terminated in front. Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
ADR-0001 §7 documents MCP writes as running "in one of two explicit modes"; pass-through adds a third credential path, so the decision needs a record of the same rank. Follows the ADR-0002 precedent: what problem the mode solves (no per-user RBAC without an IdP and vault), the decision (caller NetBox API token forwarded verbatim, fail closed, cache partitioned per fingerprint), and the accepted trade-offs (TLS required in front, IP-keyed pre-auth rate limit, tokens in process memory). Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
`Dockerfile.release` only wraps a prebuilt binary from the release matrix, so there was no way to build and run the server from a checkout. Add a multi-stage `Dockerfile` plus a `docker-compose.yml` aimed at the multi-user pass-through mode, where running a shared container is the point. The runtime image is unprivileged (uid 10001), read-only, drops all capabilities, and carries nothing but the binary and CA certificates. It publishes on loopback so a TLS-terminating proxy fronts it — callers send real NetBox credentials on every request, so plaintext off-host would leak them. No NetBox token is baked into the image or the shipped config: in pass-through mode the container has no shared credential, which is the security property worth preserving in the packaging too. The config is file-backed rather than inline because a `read_only` service cannot take content-based compose configs. Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
Compose previously hard-coded 127.0.0.1:8080 and offered no way to give the
container extra trust anchors. Set NBOX_BIND/NBOX_PORT to publish elsewhere
(loopback stays the default — callers send real NetBox credentials on every
request, so anything wider should be fronted by a TLS-terminating proxy), and
mount ${NBOX_CA_BUNDLE} at /etc/nbox/ca.pem for a NetBox behind an internal
CA, harmless when unset.
Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
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Problem
Dockerfile.releaseonly wraps a prebuilt binary from the release matrix, so there is no way to build and run the server from a checkout — and the multi-user pass-through mode (see #151) is exactly the deployment where a container is the natural shape: one shared process, TLS terminated in front.Change
A multi-stage
Dockerfile(build from source with--locked, runtime ondebian:bookworm-slim) and adocker-compose.ymlaimed at the pass-through mode.Security posture of the runtime image:
USER 10001, no shell)no-new-privilegesNBOX_BIND/NBOX_PORTonly behind a TLS-terminating proxyNBOX_CA_BUNDLEmount (/etc/nbox/ca.pem,:ro) for a NetBox behind an internal CA — harmless when unsetexamples/nbox-docker.tomlis deliberately token-free: in pass-through mode the caller's token is the only credential, and a missing one must fail rather than fall back to a server-side identity.Notes for review
Stacked on #151 — merge after it; until then the diff also shows the pass-through changes. If you'd rather keep only
Dockerfile.release, happy to drop this — the compose file is the part with real value.Checks
No Rust-code changes: fmt/clippy/build/test green as on the base branch (1404 passed / 0 failed). Docker build verified locally (
docker compose build+ config smoke).