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Security: qdequele/glutony

Security

SECURITY.md

Security

Reporting a vulnerability

Email security@meilisearch.com with a description, reproduction steps and the commit or image tag. Do not open a public issue. You will get an acknowledgement within 3 business days and a fix or mitigation plan within 30 days for confirmed issues.

Supported versions

Only the latest tagged release (ghcr.io/qdequele/glutony:latest and its semver tag) receives fixes.

Deployment notes

  • The control plane is internal. CONTROL_PLANE_TOKEN guards its /internal/* routes only: /pipelines, /jobs and /plugins on port 9000 have no authentication, so port 9000 must never be reachable from outside the cluster network. Set CONTROL_PLANE_TOKEN on every service (CONTROL_PLANE_TOKEN_DISABLED=true is for local development and the one-time upgrade step only).
  • ENVOY_TRUSTED_HEADER must be set wherever X-Meili-* headers can come from untrusted clients; the gateway refuses to start without it when LAB_SERVICE_TOKEN or LAB_INSTANCE_* is set.
  • k8s/secrets.example.yaml is an example, never applied by the kustomization. The binaries refuse to boot on its CHANGE_ME for CONTROL_PLANE_TOKEN, ADMIN_API_KEY and ENVOY_TRUSTED_HEADER.
  • SOURCE_SECRET_KEY seals stored Meilisearch keys and source credentials; keep a copy somewhere safe: losing or rotating it makes stored secrets unreadable.
  • LAB_SERVICE_TOKEN is the Lab's credential on the gateway (CREDENTIAL= of lab:hosted_engine:create); never reuse ADMIN_API_KEY for it.
  • LAB_INSTANCE_SECRET is minted and rotated by the Meilisearch Lab; revoke it there if it leaks.
  • Tenant jobs can only write with their own tenant's connections; global connections are templates.

There aren't any published security advisories