Update docs prerelease

README.md

@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ A Rust implementation of **MIKEY** (Multimedia Internet KEYing, [RFC 3830](https
 
 ```toml
 [dependencies]
-mykey = "0.2.1"
+mykey = "1.0.0"
 ```
 
 or to get whatever the latest in Crates.io is, just type:
@@ -111,13 +111,11 @@ peer.verify(received_msg.dh_public().unwrap())?;
 | Crate | Purpose |
 |---|---|
 | [`x25519-dalek`](https://crates.io/crates/x25519-dalek) | X25519 DH key exchange |
-| [`hmac`](https://crates.io/crates/hmac) + [`sha2`](https://crates.io/crates/sha2) | MIKEY PRF and MAC (HMAC-SHA-256) |
-| [`aes`](https://crates.io/crates/aes) + [`ctr`](https://crates.io/crates/ctr) | AES-CM for KEMAC payload encryption |
-| [`hkdf`](https://crates.io/crates/hkdf) | Key derivation |
+| [`hmac`](https://crates.io/crates/hmac) + [`sha1`](https://crates.io/crates/sha1) | MIKEY-1 PRF and KEMAC MAC (HMAC-SHA-1, per RFC 3830) |
 | [`base64`](https://crates.io/crates/base64) | SDP `a=key-mgmt:mikey` encoding |
 | [`hex`](https://crates.io/crates/hex) | Identity key file encoding |
 | [`rand`](https://crates.io/crates/rand) ≥ 0.9 + [`rand_core`](https://crates.io/crates/rand_core) | RAND nonce generation; `OsRng` (direct OS entropy) for X25519 keypairs. 0.9+ required to address [RUSTSEC-2026-0097](https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2026-0097). |
-| [`thiserror`](https://crates.io/crates/thiserror) | Error types |
+ [`thiserror`](https://crates.io/crates/thiserror) | Error types |
 
 ## License
 

SECURITY.md

@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ mykey is a cryptographic library. Security issues in this project include:
 - Unsafe handling of private key files (permissions, exposure in logs or errors)
 - Parsing bugs that could cause panics, memory corruption, or acceptance of invalid messages
 
-Issues in downstream dependencies (x25519-dalek, hmac, sha2, aes, rand) should be reported to those projects directly. If you believe a dependency issue has a specific impact on mykey, include that context in your report.
+Issues in upstream dependencies (x25519-dalek, hmac, sha1, rand) should be reported to those projects directly. If you believe a dependency issue has a specific impact on mykey, include that context in your report.
 
 ## Dependency Advisories
 

book/src/concepts/mikey-srtp.md

@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ MIKEY messages are compact binary structures designed for embedding in SDP sessi
 
 1. **Negotiates a TGK** (TEK Generation Key) using one of several key exchange methods
 2. **Carries a RAND** payload — a fresh random nonce per session
-3. **Derives SRTP keys** from TGK + RAND using the MIKEY PRF (HMAC-SHA-256 based)
+3. **Derives SRTP keys** from TGK + RAND using the MIKEY-1 PRF (HMAC-SHA-1 based)
 4. **Carries security policy** — tells the peer which SRTP cipher and authentication algorithm to use
 
 ### What MIKEY does not do
@@ -32,10 +32,10 @@ MIKEY messages are compact binary structures designed for embedding in SDP sessi
 
 ## The MIKEY PRF
 
-The key derivation in mykey follows RFC 3830 Section 4.1.2. Given a key and a label, it produces an output of arbitrary length using iterated HMAC-SHA-256:
+The key derivation in mykey follows RFC 3830 Section 4.1.2. Given a key and a label, it produces an output of arbitrary length using iterated HMAC-SHA-1:
 
 ```text
-PRF(key, label) = HMAC-SHA-256(key, label || 0x00 || i || output_len)
+PRF(key, label) = HMAC-SHA-1(key, label || 0x00 || i || output_len)
                   for i = 0, 1, 2, ... until enough bytes are produced
 ```
 

book/src/concepts/wire-format.md

@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ Every MIKEY message starts with a common header (RFC 3830 §6.1).
 | `data type` | `4` = DH-Init, `5` = DH-Resp, `0` = PSK-Init |
 | `next payload` | Type of the first payload that follows |
 | `V` flag | Set when a verification payload is present |
-| `PRF func` | `0` = MIKEY-PRF-HMAC-SHA-256 |
+| `PRF func` | `0` = MIKEY-1 PRF (HMAC-SHA-1) — the only PRF defined in RFC 3830 |
 | `CSB ID` | Crypto Session Bundle ID — identifies the session |
 
 The CS ID map (when `#CS > 0` and `CS ID map type = 0`) adds 9 bytes per crypto session:
@@ -76,7 +76,7 @@ The DH-value length is **implied by the group** — there is no explicit length
 !  mac_alg (8)  !  MAC (mac_alg_len bytes)                     ~
 ```
 
-Used in PSK mode to carry the TGK. `enc_alg = 0` means null encryption (plaintext TGK). `mac_alg = 0` means HMAC-SHA-256 truncated to 160 bits.
+Used in PSK mode to carry the TGK. `enc_alg = 0` means null encryption (plaintext TGK). `mac_alg = 0` means no MAC (NULL); `mac_alg = 1` means HMAC-SHA-1-160 — the mandatory MAC algorithm per RFC 3830 §6.2.
 
 ### Security Policy (type 10)