Please do not open a public issue. Use GitHub's private vulnerability reporting for this repository. You will get a first answer within a few days.

From 1.0.0 on, images are signed with keyless Sigstore cosign and carry an SBOM and SLSA provenance. Use cosign 3 and pin the identity to the tag you verify:

V=v1.1.0
cosign verify coyl/ktms-admin:${V#v} \
  --certificate-identity "https://github.com/ai-process/ktms-admin/.github/workflows/docker-publish.yml@refs/tags/$V" \
  --certificate-oidc-issuer https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com
docker buildx imagetools inspect coyl/ktms-admin:${V#v} --format '{{ json .SBOM }}'

The console holds an admin key for the KTMS gateway, which can read and change routing and mint API keys. Treat access to it accordingly:

• Only verified e-mails that match ALLOWED_EMAILS (admins), VIEWER_EMAILS (read-only) or TEAM_MEMBERSHIPS (one team's keys and spend) can sign in, and the lists are re-checked on every request. Sign-in is a password (argon2id or bcrypt hashes, with back-off per account and client address), OpenID Connect, GitHub, or an access proxy.
• An access proxy's e-mail header is trusted only from TRUSTED_PROXY_CIDRS; Cloudflare Access tokens are verified against the team's keys. Never expose the console directly when relying on a header.
• The admin key never reaches the browser; vendor API keys are write-only through the console.
• Mutating requests need a role allowed to make them, a custom X-Requested-With header and a same-origin Origin.
• Run it behind HTTPS (PUBLIC_URL=https://…); cookies are then Secure, HttpOnly and SameSite=Lax.
• INSECURE_NO_AUTH disables sign-in and is refused unless PUBLIC_URL is localhost.